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This study investigates the potential impact of the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement 
(BPCI) initiative from Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services on hospital performance and 
behavior related to effectiveness and efficiency. The BPCI is under the Affordable Care Act and 
provides hospitals with a fixed amount of reimbursement for a total episode of care. Building on 
the agency theory, I argue that the BPCI initiative has the potential to enhance the effectiveness 
and efficiency of hospital care. This quasi-experimental study examines the changes in hospital 
care outcomes of patients with replacement of the lower extremity or sepsis in BPCI-
participating hospitals and their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. Based on the 2013–
2017 inpatient discharge data of Nevada, I apply the difference-in-differences modeling to 
evaluate hospital care outcomes before and after BPCI initiative implementation. The study 
produced mixed findings, with positive changes supporting my theoretical predictions and 
hypotheses in the case of sepsis, but no changes detected in support for my theoretical 
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The increase in healthcare cost has dramatically outpaced general inflation in the United 
States (U.S.). Cost and quality of health care delivery remain a focus for the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as they attempt to contain healthcare costs. This study 
examines the impact of the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance. It is aligned with the focus of CMS on 
effective health care delivery though implementation of the BPCI initiative.   
 
Background 
 The steady increase in healthcare costs is a major concern for the U.S. economy as these 
costs continuously outpace the general economy. Total national health expenditures increased 
dramatically from $255.3 billion in 1980 to $3,337.2 billion in 2016 (Lassman et al., 2017; 
Trendwatch: Chartbook 2018: Trends Affecting Hospital and Health Systems, 2018). The CMS 
estimates that by 2026, national health spending will reach $5.7 trillion with an average growth 
rate of 5.5% per year from 2017-2026. Healthcare expenditures were 17.9% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2016 and are projected to rise to 19.7% by 2026 (National Health Expenditure 
Projections 2017-2026, 2017).   
The CMS Office of the Actuary definition of national healthcare expenditures includes all 
healthcare spending in the U.S. ("National Health Expenditure Accounts Methodology Paper, 
2016: Definitions, Sources, and Methods," 2017). According to CMS data from 2017, more than 
one-third of national healthcare expenditures were for hospital care (42.7% in 1980, 34% in 2016) 
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followed by physician services (20.9% in 2016) (Trendwatch: Chartbook 2018: Trends Affecting 
Hospital and Health Systems, 2018). More than 60% of hospital care expenditures were billed to 
government health insurance programs: Medicare (47.2%, $182.7 billion) and Medicaid (15.6%, 
$60.2 billion) ( Torio & Andrews, 2013). Medicare is a federal program that provides health 
coverage for individuals 65 and older and those with severe disabilities regardless of income 
levels. Medicaid is a state and federal program that provides health coverage to low-income 
families. Most Medicare expenditures are for hospital care and the program is projected to 
experience its greatest annual growth of 7.4% in the next few years, largely driven by Medicare 
enrollment growth and an aging population (Cuckler et al., 2018).   
Two of the greatest hospital costs are for treatment of major joint replacement of the 
lower extremity (MJRL) and sepsis ( Torio & Moore, 2006). According to CMS data, MJRL is 
the most common operation performed in hospitals and sepsis is the most common nonmaternal, 
non-neonatal principal diagnosis among all conditions and the most expensive condition treated 
in U.S. hospitals (AHRQ, 2015). In 2011, Medicare was a primary payer for 62% of inpatient 
bills for sepsis ( Torio & Andrews, 2013).   
There are several different reimbursement models for health services in the                                                
healthcare system. The fee-for-service (FFS) model pays for services separately. It gives an 
incentive for providers to offer more treatments because payment is dependent on the quantity of 
care, rather than its quality. Therefore, unnecessary services are often provided and at an 
increased cost to CMS. With the global capitation model, those making healthcare decisions 
have a fixed budget. This gives them the incentive to provide quality care within their funding. 
However, a lack of coordination in episodes of care has resulted in scrutiny of the model 
(Froimson et al., 2013). There is a middle ground between FFS and global capitation to 
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maximize patient-centered value by aligning payer and provider incentives. It is a bundled 
payment model known as an episode-based payment (Froimson et al., 2013). In 2011, CMS 
announced the BPCI initiative under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to reduce federal spending 
while maintaining or enhancing the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries (CMS, 2017). 
Evaluating how hospitals response to different reimbursement models is important to 
health service and policy research. Examining effectiveness and efficiency of the BPCI initiative 
helps better understand hospital behavior under a new value-based payment model from the 
federal government. The most recent annual report of the BPCI initiative, Year 5, by the Lewin 
Group found Medicare payments for MJRL declined significantly under the BPCI initiative 
Model 2 (CMS, 2018b). This was based on Medicare claims and enrollment data from the fourth 
quarters of 2011 through 2016 (CMS, 2018b). Research is limited on how a value-based payment 
model might improve the effectiveness of care for a non-surgical clinical episode such as sepsis.  
More work is needed to find the most effective alternative payment model to reduce the burden 
of healthcare expenditures in the U.S. This is particularly relevant for conditions that cause the 
highest hospital expenditures, MJRL and sepsis. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 Given that CMS announced the BPCI initiative under the ACA, the BPCI initiative has 
been implemented since 2013 and effectiveness of the BPCI initiative needs to be analyzed. The 
purpose of this study is to examine potential impact of the BPCI initiative on hospital 
performance in Nevada. This is a quantitative, quasi-experimental study based on secondary data 
designed to (a) examine the effectiveness of the BPCI initiatives on BPCI-participating hospitals, 
and (b) examine the efficiency of the BPCI initiatives on these hospitals over the same period.   
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Research Questions  
This study addresses the following research questions: 
1. Does the BPCI initiative have positive effects on the effectiveness of hospital 
performance for MJRL and care of sepsis? 
2. Does the BPCI initiative have positive effects on the efficiency of hospital 
performance for MJRL and care of sepsis? 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 This study uses agency theory to understand hospital organizational behavior and 
performance under the CMS BPCI initiative (Figure 1). Agency theory explains the performance 
of a hospital under the BPCI initiative on health care delivery for both surgical and non-surgical 
medical care. In summary, the agency theory is a reflection of the relationships of effectiveness 
and efficiency with the implementation of the BPCI initiative. There are two hypotheses:  
Ha:  The BPCI initiative participating hospitals are more likely to improve effectiveness 
of hospital care than non-participating hospitals. 
Hb: The BPCI initiative participating hospitals are more likely to improve efficiency of 
hospital care than non-participating hospitals. 
 
Significance of the Study 
This study uses State Inpatient Databases of Nevada (SIDN) data to provide empirical 
evidence on the performance of hospitals under the BPCI initiative.  
My research addresses several gaps in the literature. First, it determines if the BPCI 
initiative has affected hospital performance based on a longer pre- and post-intervention period.  
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Published research results are usually limited to short-term outcomes. There is some evidence, 
based on short post-implementation of the bundled payment data, that bundled payment reduces 
the cost of unnecessary or duplicative services and improves care coordination (Dundon et al., 
2016; Froemke et al., 2015). Little information is available, however, on the effectiveness of the 
BPCI initiative over a longer period. Second, this research will add to current literature 
examining effects of the BPCI initiative for medical care by showing positive effects of the BPCI 
initiative on hospital performance for sepsis. Third, it will add to the existing literature by 
providing a more comprehensive picture of the association between the BPCI initiative and 
quality of hospital performance. Several studies have examined the association between the 
BPCI initiative and quality of care in terms of readmission, emergency department (ED) visits, 
length of in-hospital stays (LOS), and mortality (Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards, Mears, & Barnes, 
2017; Froemke et al., 2015; Iorio et al., 2016; Navathe et al., 2017). This study expands the 
examination of complications as a part of the performance measurement. Finally, my study uses 
the most recent data available. Although the study is based on the data of only one state, Nevada, 
its findings still improve our understanding of hospital performance responding to a value-based 
payment model from CMS, the bundled payment.   
 
Summary 
 This chapter describes the purpose, background, and significance of the study. A 
summary of the theoretical framework of agency theory, the basis of this research, is also 
presented. Hospital performance is studied from the aspects of effectiveness and efficiency. 
Chapter two is a comprehensive literature review of the BPCI initiative and hospital performance 
on orthopedic surgery and sepsis. Chapter three discusses the conceptual framework, including 
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relationships among the constructs as well as the hypotheses of the framework. Chapter four 
contains comprehensive information of the methods used in this study, expanding the research 
questions and hypotheses to include statistical analysis. It also explains the research design and 
sample, measurements of variables, and analytical approaches. Chapter five presents the results 
of the study and Chapter six discusses the findings of this study. The last chapter also offers 
directions for future research, implications for public health policy and interventions, and 







The purpose of the review is three-fold. First, previous studies on the effects of bundled 
payments on hospital outcomes are presented. Second, methodological issues pertaining to the 
existing literature, as well as other literature gaps, are reviewed. Third the review identifies 
pertinent indicators used in the conceptual framework presented in the next chapter. 
To achieve the above purpose, several questions are addressed: (a) Does the BPCI 
initiative remain effective for a period longer than reported in previous studies? (b) Is the BPCI 
initiative effective for medical conditions? (c) Does using a different quality indicator support 
current studies that determined there were no quality changes under the BPCI initiative? (d) If 
there were any changes in hospital performance under the BPCI initiative, which organizational 
theory could best explain them? Since Major Joint Replacement of the Lower Extremity (MJRL) 
and sepsis are chosen as tracer conditions for this study, the chapter begins with descriptions of 
MJRL and sepsis. The second section reviews health services reimbursement models and the 
BPCI initiative under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The third section 
explains relationships between the bundled payment reimbursement and hospital performance.  
The sources used for the literature review were: Pub Med, Google Scholar, Kopernio database, 
publications listed on the CDC website, and a review of selected journal article citations.  Finally, 
a summary of the major points revealed by the literature review is presented. 
 
The Clinical Procedure and Condition Selected for the Study 
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 Major Joint Replacement of the Lower Extremity.  
Major joint replacement of the lower extremity (MJRL) is one of 48 episodes of care 
covered by the BPCI initiative of CMS (Appendix A). MJRL is total joint arthroplasty (TJA) and 
includes both total knee arthroplasty (TKA) and total hip arthroplasty (THA). Arthroplasty is a 
surgical procedure to restore the function of a joint by either resurfacing the bones or by using an 
artificial joint. TKA either resurfaces a knee damaged by arthritis or uses artificial parts to cap 
the ends of the bones. It is typically performed on patients with severe knee arthritis (Cram et al., 
2012; "Knee Replacement Surgery Procedure," 2018). THA is used to replace a hip joint with an 
artificial one. TJA is the most common elective surgical procedure in the U.S. and the greatest 
surgical expenditure for patients with Medicare (Cutler & Ghosh, 2012). In a longitudinal study 
between 1991 and 2001, Cram et al. (2012) showed a rapid increase of primary TKA both in 
volume (161.5% increase from 93,232 in 1991 to 243,802 in 2010) and in per capital utilization 
(99.2% increase, 31.2 procedures per 10,000 Medicare enrollees in 1991 to 62.1 procedures per 
100,000 in 2010). The incidence of TKA itself is projected to increase in the U.S. from 500,000 
in 2005 to 3.48 million by 2030. The annual incidence of joint replacement procedures is 
projected to increase considerably among aging “baby boomers” (Nichols & Vose, 2016). A 
majority of TJA patients are white, female, and 65 or older with Medicare insurance (Molloy, 
Martin, Moschetti, & Jevsevar, 2017; Nichols & Vose, 2016; Nwachukwu, McCormick, 
Provencher, Roche, & Rubash, 2015) 
There has been a consistent decrease in length of stay (LOS) after TJA surgery (Cram et 
al., 2012). Two questions have been raised regarding the reduction in LOS, as many U.S. 
hospitals are adopting the bundled payment reimbursement model. First, there are concerns about 
an association between shorter LOS and the potential need for more frequent post-discharge care 
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or readmission. One study from a Medicare Part A data file analysis of TKAs between 1991 and 
2010, observed a significant decrease in hospital LOS and an increase in hospital readmission 
rates (Cram et al., 2012). Conversely, Regenbogen et al. (2017) found no evidence among 
Medicare claims between 2009 and 2012 that a shorter LOS was more likely associated with 
frequent post-discharge care or readmission. Second, a shorter LOS after surgery might reduce 
the total cost of care. There are mixed findings in different datasets about cost of care and LOS. 
One study showed a shorter LOS was associated with lower total surgical payments from 
analyzing Medicare claims between 2009 and 2012 (Regenbogen et al., 2017). According to 
Molloy et al. (2017), hospital costs for TJA increased consistently even though LOS decreased. 
Molloy et al. (2017) used data from National Inpatient Sample from 2002 and 2013 and found a 
greater increase in mean hospital cost for both TKA (52.4%) and THA (49.8%) and a reduction 
in LOS from 4.06 to 2.97 days.  
There was a change in the trend of patient discharges between 1991 and 2010. More 
patients were discharged to outpatient rehabilitation in lieu of inpatient rehabilitation (Cram et al., 
2012). Post-discharge costs, including readmission costs, are requisite components of the total 
cost of TJA. In one estimate, initial hospitalization accounted for only about 55% of the total cost, 
and Medicare spent about $6 billion during the 90-day post-acute period in 2013 (Mechanic, 
2015). Bozic et al. (2014) found that post-discharge payments accounted for 36% of total 
payments. Approximately 49% of patients were transferred to a post-acute care (PAC) facility, 
such as a skilled nursing facility (SNF), acute rehabilitation facility, or home health services 
(HHS), which accounted for 70% of post-discharge payments (Bozic, Ward, Vail, & Maze, 
2014). Another study supported the finding that using a PAC facility was a significant variable in 
the total cost of care, as 77.0 % of patients used PAC services following surgery (Snow et al., 
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2014). Studies on costs associated with patient discharge and 90-day readmission support a 
substantial variation in costs depending on the care pathway: whether a patient is released to 
SNF after TJA surgery or readmitted in 90 days (Nichols & Vose, 2016; Patient Safety 
Indicators overview; Tsai et al., 2016). As a result, the most expensive scenario was 1.8 to 2.2 
times higher than the lowest cost scenario based on healthcare claims (Nichols & Vose, 2016).  
The trend to discharge more patients to their homes instead of SNFs after TJA procedure has 
increased significantly from 15% in 1998 to 35% in 2009 (Ong, Lotke, Lau, Manley, & Kurtz, 
2015). 
MJRL is a suitable group of surgeries for bundled payment models since it is elective, 
relatively standardized, and subject to a comparatively low spending variation (Mechanic, 2015). 
In addition, MJRL varies widely in both cost and quality, though it occurs in high volumes and 
relatively homogeneous patient populations. Bozic et al. (2014) analyzed 250 Medicare 
beneficiaries undergoing MJRL at a single hospital over a 12-month period and found bundled 
payments for MJRL varied depending on patient comorbidities and complications, discharge 
disposition, and readmission rates. Medicare reimbursements for MJRL are highly variable 
depending on geographical region, patient volume, health of the patient population, and 
government ownership of a hospital. These are other important driving forces affecting value-
based bundled payments. Based on CMS inpatient charges and reimbursement data, authors 
found higher reimbursements were correlated with lower patient volume, a healthier patient 
population, lower cost efficiency, lower quality, and government ownership (Padegimas et al., 
2016). 
The BPCI initiative classifies joint replacement according to whether or not patients have 
major complications or coexisting conditions. This classification forms the foundation for the  
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Medical Severity Diagnosis-Related Groups (MS-DRGs). MS-DRG 469 is for MJRL patients 
with major complications or coexisting conditions and MS-DRG 470 is for MJRL patients 
without complications (Appendix A). 
 
 Sepsis. 
 Sepsis is a serious medical condition caused by an overwhelming, life-threatening 
immune response to infection ("Sepsis," 2018). Sepsis is a substantial burden on the U.S. 
healthcare system. The mean age of sepsis patients is 65 years (Paoli et al., 2018; Rhee et al., 
2017). It is a leading cause of in-hospital death and the most frequent and expensive condition 
treated in U.S. hospitals. With a continuous increase in the incidence of sepsis, sepsis-associated 
hospital stays almost tripled between 2005 and 2014 (McDermott, 2017; Stoller et al., 2016). A 
number of studies were conducted using retrospective databases to examine temporal trends on 
the incidence of sepsis and in-hospital death. The incidence of sepsis increased, but in-hospital 
mortality consistently decreased from 2000 to 2012, based on the International Classification of 
Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD- 9-CM) codes from National Inpatient 
Sample data (Stevenson, Rubenstein, Radin, Wiener, & Walkey, 2014; Stoller et al., 2016).  
However, it is unclear whether the rise in incidence and decrease in in-hospital mortality were 
true, or whether the reported outcomes were artifacts due to changes in coding and discharge 
practices. As coding practices became more inclusive, it might have resulted in an increased 
awareness and diagnosis of sepsis. A reduction of in-hospital mortality may be an outcome of 
discharging patients to long-term acute care facilities prior to in-hospital death. However, 
concerns over the reliability of studies based on claim data were reduced when studies using 
clinical data sets reported the same trends of decreasing in-hospital mortality for sepsis (Rhee et  
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al., 2017; Stevenson et al., 2014).  
There was a decrease in LOS from 17.3 to 7 days over the 12-year period from 2000–
2012, and home discharges have increased steadily since then, regardless of the severity of sepsis 
(Paoli, Reynolds, Sinha, Gitlin, & Crouser, 2018; Stoller et al., 2016). Studies also have reported 
that more than 40% of patients are discharged to SNFs or intermediate care facilities rather than 
home or HHS (Rhee et al., 2017; Stoller et al., 2016). There has been a slight increase in home 
discharge but discharge to SNFs remains the same. Different from surgical conditions, studies 
found that increased LOS for medical conditions was highly associated with reduced rates of 
early hospital death and fewer readmissions (Eapen et al., 2013; Southern & Arnsten, 2015; 
Stukel et al., 2012). 
Sepsis differs from MJRL in that it is not diagnosed until after admission. There is also 
more than one therapeutic intervention for sepsis, which must target different pathways due to 
variability in the pathogenesis of sepsis (Khan & Divatia, 2010; Paoli et al., 2018). Early Goal-
Directed Therapy (EGDT) is a protocol that manages sepsis during the six hours following 
diagnosis. Rivers et al. (2001) found significant benefits in outcomes for patients with sepsis 
assigned to EGDT. Timing of the diagnosis of sepsis and early treatment are critical to clinical 
outcomes and financial burdens. When sepsis was not diagnosed on hospital admission, the total 
cost of sepsis treatment was much higher: $51,022 if undiagnosed compared to $18,023 when 
diagnosed on admission (Paoli et al., 2018). The Institute for Healthcare Improvement and CMS 
proposed sepsis care bundles based on EGDT in 2004. The goal was to improve uniformity and 
universality of sepsis treatment by reducing the variability in clinical practice (Jozwiak, Monnet, 
& Teboul, 2016; Khan & Divatia, 2010; Paoli et al., 2018). Bundled care processes established a 
shared clinical baseline, standardizing interventions to reduce variation among clinicians (Miller 
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et al., 2013). A sepsis care bundle is a group of therapies built around evidence-based guidelines 
rather than individual therapies. Numerous studies have shown the effectiveness of these bundles 
(Khan & Divatia, 2010; Levy et al., 2004) as in-hospital mortality and LOS have decreased 
(Castellanos-Ortega et al., 2010; Girardis et al., 2009; Levy et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2013; 
Noritomi et al., 2014). Additionally, the cost of care per patient has decreased as the condition of 
patients improved (Noritomi et al., 2014). However, the use of sepsis care bundles is low, with a 
compliance of about 5% (Jozwiak et al., 2016). Therefore, including sepsis in the BPCI initiative 
was in line with its goal: to produce higher quality, more coordinated care at a lower cost to 
Medicare.   
 The BPCI initiative classifies sepsis in three categories depending on use of mechanical 
ventilation and the presence of complications. MS-DRG 870 is septicemia or severe sepsis and 
the use of mechanical ventilation for more than 96 hours. MS-DRG 871 is septicemia or severe 
sepsis, using mechanical ventilation for more than 96 hours, plus major complications or 
comorbidity. MS-DRG 872 is septicemia or severe sepsis without using mechanical ventilation 
for more than 96 hours and without major complications or comorbidity (Appendix A). 
 
Bundled Payments Mechanism and the CMS Initiative 
 
 Bundled payments.  
Bundled payments, or episode of care payments, are value-based payment models. The 
payer makes a single payment to providers and healthcare facilities for all the healthcare services 
performed to treat a patient for a certain condition within a defined period of time. Bundled 
payments are an incentive to provide quality-of-care services and move away from an emphasis 
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on quantity of care. Providing care within a single payment per patient can reduce unnecessary 
tests and procedures. Ways of reducing excessive spending may include reducing factors that 
lead to prolonged inpatient stays and omitting redundancy and waste of medical supplies and 
employee time (Mechanic, 2015; Tsai et al., 2016). Conventionally, Medicare uses a FFS 
payment model that makes separate payments to providers for each service they perform during a 
course of treatment. The FFS approach rewards quantity of services rather than quality of care, 
resulting in duplicate and unnecessary diagnostic procedures (Tsai & Miller, 2015). Alternatively, 
bundled payments set a fixed reimbursement amount to be shared among all providers: 
physicians, allied health professionals, hospitals, and other facilities. This approach prevents 
fragmented care, provides minimal coordination across health care settings, and requires 
hospitals and physicians to work collaboratively to manage costs and processes from a single 
pool of resources.  
 Surgical inpatient care is about 40% of all hospital and physician bills to Medicare. With 
a prospective payment system, hospitals and their physicians continue to be paid for each unit of 
service for any adverse outcomes after the surgery, in addition to fixed payments from Medicare.    
Analysis of Medicare data for four of the most common types of inpatient surgical care, 
including hip surgery, showed hospital payments provided the greatest variability and were 
responsible for the biggest share of payments overall among hospitals (Birkmeyer et al., 2010). 
 
CMS episode-based Bundled Payment Programs. 
 
 Acute Care Episode (ACE) Demonstration: 2009 – 2012.  
The Inpatient Prospective Payment System and Medicare Physician Fee Schedule are the 
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payment systems CMS uses for hospitals (Part A) and physicians (Part B) during an inpatient 
stay. In the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, a number of relative value units for each 
procedure determine a payment level for each procedure. Physician work is the largest 
component of a relative value unit and it’s defined as the time, intensity, and skill required to 
perform a service (Urwin et al., 2019).   
In 2009, Medicare introduced the ACE Demonstration project under section 646 of the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Monetization Act of 2003. Its purpose was to test 
the use of a bundled payment for inpatient episodes of care for orthopedic and cardiovascular 
surgery (CMS, 2010). Under the ACE Demonstration, Medicare made a single payment to 
hospitals for both hospital and physician services provided during an inpatient day. Specifically, 
ACE Demonstration tested the effect of bundling Part A and Part B payments for episodes of 
acute care. It was a three-year pilot program limited to five sites in four states: Texas, Oklahoma, 
New Mexico, and Colorado. In terms of gainsharing, Medicare shared savings up to a maximum 
of the annual Part B premium with beneficiaries who participated in the ACE Demonstration.  
Medicare also shared savings with participating hospital-physician partnerships if profits were 
realized. To be able to gainshare, hospital-physician partnerships agreed to an average 5% 
discount in DRG payments from CMS (Rana & Bozic, 2015).   
In summary, the ACE Demonstration was a pilot program to test bundling hospital (Part 
A) and physician (Part B) payments for episodes of acute care. However, post-acute care 
payments were not included in the ACE Demonstration. With this program, most of the studies  
showed a decrease in the overall cost per orthopedic surgery episode by reducing LOS and 
implant prices, and gainsharing with physicians was possible (CMS, 2010; Davis, 2010; Rana & 
Bozic, 2015). The CMS final evaluation report on ACE Demonstration stated reduction in cost of  
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care and LOS with containing quality of care (Urdapilleta et al., 2013).  
 
 Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative: 2013 –2018.  
In 2011, CMS announced the BPCI initiative under section 3021 of the Patient Protection 
and ACA with an emphasis on efficiency and quality of care, by shifting FFS Medicare payment 
models toward value-based models (Dundon et al., 2016; Perla et al., 2018; Tsai, Joynt, Wild, 
Orav, & Jha, 2015). The Initiative is a voluntary participation that allows participants to choose 
among different models as well as among 48 clinical episodes (Appendix A). The Medicare 
Severity-Diagnosis Related Group (MS-DRG) of qualifying hospitalization defined the clinical 
episodes. The initiative has included 1,201 hospitals and the most popular episode among 
participating hospitals was MJRL. The BPCI initiative began in 2013 and providers could 
terminate their participation at any time. One of the objectives of the BPCI initiative was to make 
hospitals and physicians financially accountable not only for inpatient care but also for post-
discharge care, and allow gainsharing between hospitals and physicians across services by 
aligning stakeholders’ incentives (Rana & Bozic, 2015).   
The BPCI initiative is a three-year program composed of four innovative models defined 
by different episodes of care (Table 1). In Model 1, the episode of care includes all MS-DRGs 
for the inpatient stay in an acute care hospital, like the ACE Demonstration. Medicare paid a 
reduced amount to hospitals based on rates from the original Medicare program’s Inpatient 
Prospective Payment System. Physicians were paid by Medicare based on the Medicare 
Physician Fee Schedule (CMS, 2017a). The first and second cohort of Awardees in Model 1 
began in April 2013 and January 2014 and concluded on March 31, 2016 and December 31, 
2016, respectively. Models 1, 2, and 3 involved a retrospective bundling model that reconciled 
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actual payments against a target price (CMS, 2017b, 2017c; Kivlahan et al., 2016; Mechanic, 
2015; Rana & Bozic, 2015; Tsai et al., 2015). For Model 2, the target price for each selected 
episode was set at a two- to 3-percent discount based on three years of Medicare claims data for 
the participants (Tsai et al., 2015). Two percent was applied to 30- and 60-day bundles and three 
percent was applied to 90-day bundles. BPCI initiative participating hospitals could determine 
their recalculated target prices at the end of each quarter (Mechanic, 2015). A participant would 
receive additional payments as an incentive if actual payments were less than the target price; 
otherwise participants were responsible for refunding the excess to CMS as a penalty. An 
episode of care in Model 2 included a Medicare beneficiary’s inpatient stay in an acute care 
hospital, post-acute care, and all related services during the episode of care. This period ended 30, 
60, or 90 days after hospital discharge based on the 48 different clinical episodes. Section 1861(i) 
of the Social Security Act includes a 3-day inpatient hospital stay prior to receiving SNF services 
covered by Medicare Part A. For Model 2 participants, this requirement was waived upon a 
hospital’s request (CMS, 2017b; Nichols & Vose, 2016). The first cohort of BPCI participants 
began on October 1, 2013 and the second on January 1, 2014. Additional cohorts began on 
January 1, April 1, and July 1, 2015, and the BPCI initiative was extended until September 30, 
2018 for Models 2, 3, and 4. As of July 1, 2018, 253 acute-care hospitals and 152 physician 
group practices had participated in BPCI initiative Model 2.  Model 3 involved only the post-
acute period following discharge from the hospital for selected DRGs (Table 1). It covered SNF, 
HHS, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, physician group practices, and long-term-care hospitals 
(CMS, 2017c). Model 4 was a single, prospective, bundled payment for both hospital and 
physicians. It covered the acute inpatient stay and related 30-day readmissions after hospital 
discharge for selected DRGs. The first cohorts of participants in Models 3 and 4 began in 
 18 
October 2013. As of July 1, 2018, the BPCI Model 4 had two participants in Phase 2.  
There were two phases of the BPCI initiative for Models 2, 3, and 4.  Phase 1 was the 
preparation period where CMS and its participants plan implementation of the BPCI and accept 
the financial risk. To remain in the BPCI, a participating organization must transit at least one 
clinical episode among the 48 to Phase 2 by July 1, 2015. Phase 1 ended on September 30, 2015 
and the transition to Phase 2 of all clinical episodes for all participants was completed. Phase 2 
was a risk-bearing phase. It was a three-year period of performance for each clinical episode. 
Phase 2 was extended until September 30, 2018, allowing awardees to extend their period of 
performance for all clinical episodes for up to two years. As of July 2018, Phase 2 of the BPCI 
initiative had 1,025 participants composed of 206 Awardees and 819 Episode Initiators (CMS, 
2017d). MJRL was the most common condition among hospitals that participated in Phase 2 of 
the BPCI initiative (Tsai et al., 2015).  
 
BPCI Initiative Model 2 
 An episode payment is defined by the length of time covered and range of providers and 
services included for a single episode of care (CHQPR, 2015). The BPCI initiative Model 2 has 
the most comprehensive bundle, including all related providers and services for a single patient 
for a single episode of care, from the starting point to up to 90 days after discharge. Model 2 
includes four different time stages: pre-admission, hospitalization, post-acute care, and 
readmission or complication from the same episode of care up to 90-days following discharge 
from the hospital (Figure 2) (CHQPR, 2015). The episode starts when a beneficiary is admitted 
to or visited by an episode-initiating acute-care hospital or a physician. All related professional 
services provided by a primary care physician (PCP), surgeon or other specialist, in addition to 
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imaging services and drugs, are included in the pre-admission stage. For example, a Medicare 
beneficiary visits a PCP for hip pain and the PCP refers him or her to an orthopedic specialist. 
The orthopedic surgeon or the PCP orders imaging and blood tests and the patient is prescribed 
drugs to ease the pain. If the orthopedic surgeon determines the patient needs a MJRL and the 
patient agrees to the surgery, the patient is admitted to a hospital. During hospitalization, an 
anesthesiologist, orthopedic surgeon, radiologist, and hospital staff are involved in the surgical 
intervention. Implants, blood transfusion, other devices, and drugs used in surgery are services 
included during hospitalization. If the patient is discharged to a PAC facility, such as a 
rehabilitation facility, plus long-term care after the MJRL procedure, expenses for other 
specialists and related staff are also covered under the Model 2 bundled payments. Home care 
and a PCP care manager, plus services provided during the PAC such as imaging and drugs, are 
included in the Model 2 bundled payments. Since the BPCI initiative Model 2 extends for 90 
days, if the patient is readmitted to the hospital for the same MJRL-related care, all expenses 
during readmission are included in a bundled payment.  
According to the Lewin Group (CMS, 2018b) analysis of Awardee-submitted data, 
physicians, physician group practices, hospitals, institutional PACs, and home health agencies 
are the most common gainsharing partners to receive net payment reconciliation and internal cost 
savings under Model 2. Physicians receive 88.3% of a gainsharing distribution. Of these, most 
are orthopedic surgeons. From Quarter 4, 2013 through Quarter 2, 2017, each orthopedic surgeon 
received $23,005 in net reconciliation and averaged $15, 087 in internal cost savings. The 
amount of the payments received by the different providers under Model 2 is unknown, since 
their financial arrangements are specified in each “Awardees” agreement with CMS. To ensure 
quality of care, CMS assesses the patient’s experience of the care and health outcomes by 
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analyzing claims and quality reporting from the Awardees, including surveys and patient-
assessment tools. In order to examine the effects of bundled payments, assessment and 
monitoring activities and data collection efforts are required for BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals. Number of  ED visits, mortality, and readmissions are used to determine quality of 
care by the CMS Annual report on the BPCI initiative (CMS, 2018b). 
 
Relationship between Bundled Payments and Hospital Performance  
In the most recent annual report for the BPCI initiative Year 5, the Lewin Group (CMS, 
2018b) found Medicare payments under the BPCI initiative Model 2 declined considerably for 
24 of the 32 hospital-initiated clinical episodes analyzed, with little changes in quality of care.  
This report used a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method based on Medicare claims and 
enrollment data from the baseline period, Quarter 4, 2011, through Quarter 3, 2012, to the 
intervention period, Quarter 4, 2013, through Quarter 4, 2016. Declines in the use of PAC 
facilities were primarily attributed to Medicare payment reductions. Savings for the Medicare 
program under Initiative Model 2, however, were not realized overall after reconciliation 
payments were made to the other participants. Under Model 2, the Initiative resulted in a net loss 
to Medicare of $202.1 million from Quarter 4 2011 to Quarter 4 2016.  
 
 Bundled payments and episodes of care. 
Joynt Maddox et al. (2018) examined the effect of five medical conditions in the BPCI 
initiative: congestive heart failure, pneumonia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 
sepsis, and acute myocardial infarction. Based on Medicare claims from 2013 through 2015, they 
found no significant changes in Medicare payments, LOS, ED use, 30- or 90-day hospital 
 21 
readmissions, or mortality for these five medical conditions. Their finding supports earlier 
studies on the efficacy of BPCI intervention for COPD by Bhatt et al. (2017). The Medicare 
BPCI initiative did not reduce overall costs or 30-day readmission rates even though COPD 
patients under the initiative were more likely to receive effective hospital care through regular 
follow-up calls and pulmonary clinic visits than COPD patients treated at non-participating 
hospitals (Bhatt et al., 2017). Early results from the Lewin Group reported similar financial 
outcomes for the cardiovascular surgery episode between October 2013 and September 2014.  
The Lewin Group (CMS, 2018b) reported no significant changes for inpatient hospital 
LOS or for patients discharged to PAC facilities across all clinical episodes during the BPCI 
initiative. Regarding discharge locations among patients receiving PAC, the use of institutional 
PAC declined significantly for 13 clinical episodes: cardiac valve replacement; coronary artery 
bypass graft; esophagitis, gastroenteritis and other digestive disorders; fractures of the femur, hip 
or pelvis; MJRL; nutritional metabolic disorders, other reparatory, revision of MJRL; sepsis; 
simple pneumonia and respiratory infections; transient ischemia; and urinary tract infection.  
Quality of care did not change under Model 2 according to the Lewin Group (CMS, 
2018b). The mortality rate declined for more than half of the clinical episodes in BPCI-
participating hospitals, except for coronary artery bypass grafts. The use of EDs during the 90 
days after discharge from the hospital decreased significantly for major joint replacement of the 
upper extremity, stroke, syncope, and collapse. The results for 90-day readmission rates were 
mixed. Compared to the baseline period, there was an increase in readmission rates among 
clinical episodes for: fractures of the femur, hip or pelvis, and revisions of the hip or knee; 
gastrointestinal obstruction; and percutaneous coronary intervention. There were two episodes of 
care with a statistically significant decrease in the 90-day readmission rates: esophagitis,  
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 gastroenteritis and other digestive disorders; and spinal fusion. 
 
 Bundled payments and orthopedic surgery. 
 
 Cost of care. 
Many studies show positive financial outcomes for the BPCI initiative Model 2 and the 
MJRL episode of care. The recent BPCI initiative Year 5 annual report by the Lewin Group 
(CMS, 2018b) found that Medicare payments for MJRL declined significantly under Model 2.  
The Group used the DiD method based on Medicare claims and enrollment data from Quarter 4, 
2011 through Quarter 4, 2016. Declines in PAC were the main contribution in reducing Medicare 
payments. Dummit et al. (2016) evaluated the association between hospitals participating in the 
BPCI initiative and Medicare payments for quality of care. For the baseline period from October 
2011 to September 2012 and an intervention period from October 2013 to June 2015, they 
estimated the difference in outcomes for Medicare FFS beneficiaries. Results showed that 
Medicare payments were $1,166 lower for BPCI-participating hospitals. These savings were 
primarily due to a reduction in institutional PAC, with no important change in readmissions, ED 
visits, or mortality. Another study of CMS claim data for a single hospital from the first and 
second quarter of 2013 showed a 10% Medicare cost reduction under the BPCI initiative 
compared to the July 2009 to June 2012 baseline period and the target price (Iorio et al., 2016). 
Edwards and et al. (2017) studied the same Medical claim data for a three-year baseline period, 
2009 to 2012. Costs were usually greater for revision TJAs than primary TJAs, mainly because 
of a mixed patient population, more complications, and a greater complexity of surgical 
interventions. Courtney and others (2016) compared revision TJA patients in bundled and 
 23 
nonbundled groups from one hospital system using CMS data between October 2013 and March 
2015. There were no differences in total costs to CMS, however, between revision TJA before or 
after the BPCI initiative (Courtney, Ashley, Hume, & Kamath, 2016).   
Post-acute care and hospital readmissions are two prime areas of opportunity for 
meaningful cost reductions (Kivlahan et al., 2016). CMS claims data for 27 BPCI initiative-
participating teaching hospitals showed that PAC (SNF, home health agency, inpatient rehab, 
and inpatient psych) comprised 67% of post-discharge payments for the MJRL episode of care 
with 22% attributable to readmissions (Kivlahan et al., 2016). The average Medicare payment 
per episode for inpatient rehabilitation (IP Rehab) dropped from $5,000 and $8,000 during the 
baseline years of 2009 to 2012, to about $1,000 after participating in the BPCI initiative from 
2013 to 2014. A steady increase in home health use was credited with the rapid decrease in the 
use of IP Rehab. Results from the CMS final reports were similar. The Lewin Group reported 
that lower PAC payments and increased HHA payments led to reductions in total Medicare 
payments for MJRL (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 
5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018).  
 Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina was a payer employed in a value-based 
reimbursement model for MJRL. The MJRL bundle included hospital admission, surgery, 
anesthesia, physician fees, the implant device, facility fees, lab tests, care coordinator, and all 
PAC up to 90-days. The payer reported 8–10% savings from bundling in 2011. Unbundled 
MJRL costs were between $25,000 and $43,000 and decreased to $22,000 to $30,000 when the 
total costs were bundled (Action Plan for Bundled Payments, 2015). 
 
 Length of in-hospital stay. 
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The 2018 annual report on the BPCI initiative supports other studies on the effect of 
Model 2 on LOS for MJRL (Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2017; Iorio et al., 2016). The 
report indicates reductions in LOS among Model 2-participating hospitals compared to non-
participating hospitals (CMS, 2018b). Iorio and et al. (2016) found that LOS decreased from 4.27 
to 3.38 days in a single hospital based on Medicare data. Another study also reported a decrease 
in LOS from 3.81 to 2.57 days using the same Medicare claims data but analyzing a longer 
intervention period, from October 2013 to September 2014. A reduced LOS from 5.27 to 4.02 
days also occurred among patients who had revision MJRL surgeries (Courtney et al., 2016).   
 
 Outcome of care. 
Many studies have indicated that the BPCI initiative reduced payments for the MJRL 
episode with no changes in quality of care ((Doran & Zabinski, 2015; Dummit et al., 2016; 
Edwards et al., 2017; Iorio et al., 2016; Siddiqi et al., 2017). With a significant reduction in LOS 
among Model 2-participating hospitals, there were concerns of an increase in PAC discharge and 
readmission rates in exchange for shorter hospital stays. However, earlier studies on the BPCI 
initiative showed a reduction in LOS was not associated with SNF discharge and readmission 
rates. A study comparing the first and third years of the Initiative at a single academic hospital 
from 2013 to 2015 found reduced rates of discharging patients to inpatient facilities and a 
reduction in readmissions (Dundon et al., 2016). Discharges to home health care increased by 23% 
along with an 88% cost reduction in IP Rehab. Iorio and et al. (2016) found a reduction in 
discharges to inpatient facilities. Their study showed a higher portion of readmitted patients were 
those discharged to facility-based settings rather than patients discharged to home health 
assistance or self-care (Iorio et al., 2016). Edward et al. (2017) reported a decrease in 90-day 
 25 
readmissions from 16 to 10%, with a 23% reduction in the average cost of readmissions 
(Edwards et al., 2017). The Lewin Group report also supported the current findings of a PAC 
discharge reduction for MJRL under initiative Model 2 (CMS, 2018b). However, findings from 
different studies were mixed regarding quality of care and outcomes such as ED use and 
mortality rate. The Lewin group found no significant changes in these measures under Model 2.  
Navathe and et al. (2018) provided a more complete view of the effects of the Model 2 
BPCI initiative on cost reduction by comparing it to the ACE Demonstration. ACE and the BPCI 
initiative are both bundled payment reimbursement models, except ACE doesn’t include post-
acute care. Their study analyzed Medicare claims and internal cost data from a healthcare system 
that participated in both ACE and the BPCI initiative. Hospitals participating in both ACE and 
the BPCI initiative had a decrease in LOS and in the cost for both DRG 469 and DRG 470. There 
were no major differences in the number of ED visits or 30-day readmissions after the surgery. 
However, only BPCI initiative-participating hospitals had a decline in average PAC spending of 
$2,442.12, or 27% per case (Navathe, Liao, Polsky, et al., 2018). 
 
Bundled payment and sepsis. 
 
Cost of care. 
A study by Joynt Maddox et al. (2018) examined effects of the BPCI initiative on the 
individual components of payment that included total 90-day Medicare payments, payments for 
readmissions, skilled nursing, IP Rehab, long-term care hospitals, home health agencies, 
physician fees, and non-physician outpatient fees for sepsis. From DiD analyses of Medicare 
claims from 2013 through 2015, they found no significant changes in Medicare payments at 
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BPCI-participating hospitals compared with comparison (non-participating) hospitals (Joynt 
Maddox, Orav, Zheng, & Epstein, 2018). Findings from the Lewin Group reported no marked 
changes in total Medicare payments at BPCI-participating hospitals although there was a sizable 
decrease in Medicare payments for SNF (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement 
Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018).  
A non-research article reported a successful Medicare bundle for sepsis at the St. Joseph 
Health System in South Bend, Indiana (Meyer, 2018). St. Joseph adopted evidence-based clinical 
pathways for sepsis that allowed better ED and inpatient care during the first six hours after 
sepsis was diagnosed. As a result, patients were more likely to be directly discharged to home 
rather than to a SNF. With a decrease in the use of SNFs, St. Joseph was able to cut costs and 
meet the bundled payment target.  
 
 Length of in-hospital stay. 
 The BPCI 2018 annual report from the Lewin Group supported Joynt Maddox’s findings 
that there was no significant changes in LOS for sepsis at BPCI-participating hospitals relative to 
non-participating hospitals comparing before and after the BPCI initiative (CMS, 2018b; Joynt 
Maddox et al., 2018).   
 
 Outcome of care. 
Two empirical studies on effects of the BPCI initiative for sepsis measured changes in 
outcomes of ED use, readmissions, and mortality between BPCI-participating and comparison 
hospitals. Joynt Maddox and et al. (2018) and the Lewin Group (CMS, 2018b) observed no 
differences in ED use, hospital readmissions, or mortality between participating and non- 
 27 
participating hospitals, before and after the BPCI initiative.    
 
Summary and Literature Gap 
Numerous studies of the early BPCI initiative have shown the effectiveness and 
efficiency of bundled payments for MJRL. The BPCI initiative was associated with decreases in 
LOS, mortality, discharging patients to SNF, and Medicare payments without changes in quality 
of care at BPCI-participating hospitals compared with non-participating hospitals (Carroll, 
Chernew, Fendrick, Thompson, & Rose, 2018; Dummit et al., 2016; Dummit et al., 2018; 
Dundon et al., 2016; Froemke et al., 2015; Iorio et al., 2016; Kivlahan et al., 2016; J. M. Zhu, 
Patel, Shea, Neuman, & Werner, 2018). However, a few studies on sepsis reported no significant 
effects of the BPCI initiative on hospital performance (CMS Bundled Payments for Care 
Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018; Joynt 
Maddox et al., 2018). 
My study will contribute to four aspects of the literature. First, it will contribute to 
literature that examines the effects of the BPCI initiative using a short baseline and intervention 
period. For example, most of studies for MJRL were based on CMS Medicare claims data using 
a short baseline period (2 to 36 months) and intervention (3 to 20 months) (Dummit et al., 2018; 
Edwards et al., 2017; Froemke et al., 2015). For sepsis, Joynt Maddox and et al. (2018) used a 6-
month baseline period and a 9-month intervention period (Joynt Maddox et al., 2018). To the 
best of my knowledge, my study is the first to address effects of the BPCI initiative on hospital 
performance for MJRL and sepsis based on a longer pre-intervention period (27 months) and 
post-interventions period (27 to 30 months) using the most current data.  
Second, this study will contribute to literature that uses DiD analyses to determine effects 
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of the BPCI initiative. For example, the Lewin Group report used DiD analyses, but there were 
large differences in baseline periods of the outcome between BPCI and matched comparison 
group (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation 
& Monitoring Annual Report, 2018). Therefore, results could have been biased. A study by Joynt 
Maddox and et al. (2018) showed parallel baseline trends, yet they used a relatively short 
baseline period. To address the validity of DiD, my study will test the significance of differences 
in the average trend in outcomes in the treatment and comparison groups over the period of time 
leading up to the BPCI initiative (McCoy, McDonough, & Rochowdhury, 2017).  
Third, this study will contribute to literature that examines factors that determine quality 
of care. For example, most studies on the BPCI initiative use mortality, ED use, and hospital 
readmission as quality measures (Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2017; Froemke et al., 2015; 
Joynt Maddox et al., 2018). To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to use Patient 
Safety Indicators (PSIs) to determine complications following procedures.  
Fourth, this study will contribute to literature that examines effects of the BPCI initiative 
for sepsis, since only a limited number of studies are available. For example, Joynt Maddox et al. 
(2018) and a report from the Lewin Group (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement 
Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018) are the only two 
empirical studies on the BPCI initiative for sepsis.   
Therefore, my project will help fill literature and research gaps by comparing effects of 
the BPCI initiative for MJRL and sepsis on hospital performance based on state inpatient 
discharge data with longer baselines and intervention periods. The purpose of this study, 
therefore, is to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the BPCI initiative on hospital 
performances for MJRL and sepsis in Nevada. 
 29 
Chapter 3 
Conceptual Framework  
 
 The rationale for this study and the associated literature review are based on a theoretical 
agency framework. My goal is to understand how incentives of the BPCI initiative influence 
hospital effectiveness and efficiency of care. I also address historical development and constructs.  
 
Agency Theory 
An open-system view of organizational structure was expanded by the relational concept 
of organizations as a nexus of contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Scott, 2003). Agency theory 
describes the relationship between a principal and an agent; the principal delegates work to the 
agent and the agent performs that work (Figure 3) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mitnick, 1975; 
Ross, 1973). In the 1960s, economists identified a problem among cooperating parties with 
different attitudes towards sharing risk. As early as 1973, scholars included risk sharing as an 
agency problem within the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Eisenhardt 
(1988, 1989) addressed the agency problem and the problem of risk sharing as part of agency 
relationships. An agency problem occurs when the goals of the principal conflict with those of 
the agent, and when the principal doesn’t have enough information about the agent’s work. The 
goal of agency theory, therefore, is to develop the most effective contract between the principal 
and their agent. 
Agency theory has been applied to different fields of research including economics, 
finance, accounting, political science, organizational behavior, and sociology. Some have 
criticized it as not clearly addressing the problem of organization (Jensen, 1983; Perrow, 1986), 
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but Jensen (1983) considered agency theory as “the foundation for a powerful theory of 
organizations.” In the controversy over agency theory, Eisenhardt (1989) discovered two 
contributions of the theory to organizational perspective. First, by treating information as a 
commodity in agency theory, organizations are able to invest in information systems and 
constrain the agent’s self-interest. The implication of risk is the second contribution of agency 
theory. Outcome uncertainty is perceived as a risk-award trade-off, rather than just a risk. 
Therefore, contracts between principals and agents are affected by a willingness between 
principals and agents to take risks. 
The agency structure is valid in diverse settings, including macro- to micro-level dyad 
phenomena. Agency theory has been applied to various aspects of organizations including 
compensation and incentives (Sappington, 1991), ownership and board relations, and when and 
how to diversify, among other factors. The application of agency structure to the healthcare 
system is a diverse, complex principal-agent relationship (Figure 4) (Casalino, 2001). For 
example, a medical group acts as an agent of a health plan, and simultaneously as a principal to a 
physician and a patient. According to Eisenhardt (1989): 
 
Overall, the domain of agency theory is relationships that mirror the basic agency 
structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative behavior, but have 
differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk (p59). 
 
There are two lines of agency theory: positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 1983). Using 
the positivist agency theory, potential conflicting goals between the principal and their agent are 
identified, and then ways to reduce the agent’s self-interest are proposed. It is especially effective 
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if the principal is able to monitor the agent’s performance. It has been suggested that an agent is 
more apt to act in the interest of the principal if the contract is based on outcomes (Eisenhardt, 
1998). Conversely, the principal-agent theory is behavior-based. It seeks to forge the contract 
that best satisfies both the principal and the agent and this occurs when the principal can 
determine the agent’s actions by measuring the outcomes (Demski, 1978). This is especially 
valid if a moral hazard and lack of information about the outcome are added. Eisenhardt (1989) 
developed eight propositions based on the principal-agent theory to determine the most effective 
contract between behavior (e.g., salaries) and outcome-based (e.g., commissions) contracts 
(Figure 5).   
The outcomes of contracts often depend on uncontrolled variables, such as policies, 
competitor actions, and the economic climate, in addition to an agent’s behavior. When the 
uncertainty of an outcome is high, the costs of shifting risk to the agent are high and behavior-
based contracts are more attractive than outcome-based contracts. A conflict of goals between 
principal and agent can exist in outcome-based contracts. If a conflict exists, the agent is not 
likely to behave as the principal desires and monitoring the agent will be necessary for 
establishing outcome-based contracts.  
Agency problems in the healthcare setting also occur. Dranove and White (1987) 
illustrated the agency relationship between patients, physicians, and hospitals from the agency 
perspective in a metaphor of FFS and Health Maintenance Organizations. Behavior within the 
FFS system that led to the creation of alternate payment models was explained by the asymmetry 
of information between the physician and patient. Under the FFS system, physicians tend to 
overuse medical services as they have more information about illnesses and courses of treatment 
than patients do. As a result, increased cost pressures on FFS insurers led to different types of 
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contracts, such as Health Maintenance Organizations, that share risks with their providers.   
Casalino (2001) discussed the agency relationship in healthcare relative to uncertainty. 
For example, uncertainty of the patients’ ability to pay for health care was reduced with creation 
of the public health care programs, Medicare and Medicaid. At the same time, however, 
uncertainty of the physicians’ quality and cost of care increased. Casalino viewed FFS and 
managed care through a lens of uncertainty as, “patient uncertainty about the ability to afford 
care; patient, purchaser, and payer uncertainty about the quality of care; and purchaser and payer 
uncertainty about the cost of care” (Casalino, 2001).  
Principal-agent theory has been used to examine behavior of health care organizations in 
previous studies. DeBrock and Arnould (1992) discussed capitation as a risk-sharing 
arrangement in the physician-insurer relationship to alleviate moral hazard (Debrock & Arnould, 
1992). The physician was considered a double agent for the hospital and the patient in the study 
by Ellis and McGuire (1986). An empirical study by Schneider and Mathios (2006) evaluated 
physician behavior under different payment systems using a principal-agent framework.  
  
In summary, agency theory serves as a foundation and justification for analyzing hospital 
performance in the BPCI initiative. The agency theory defines the goal and focus of my study. It 
provides a conceptual and theoretical framework for understanding the relationships among the 
constructs of the model, measured by variables used in the study. The agency theory also 
provides a context for interpreting the study results.   
 
Organizational Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of an organization is determined by its organizational structure (Scott,  
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 2003). Different criteria for effectiveness also determine the success of an organization. From 
the open-system perspective, profitability, adaptability, and flexibility are important criteria 
because organizations and their environments are highly interdependent in an open system. 
Weick (1977) said one of the characteristics of effective organizations was, “structural units that 
are loosely articulated so as to maximize sensitivity to the environment and diversity of response.”  
The level of analysis is another important source of variation among effectiveness criteria. 
Researchers have described the predictable behavior of organizations by using different 
developmental stages. Lyden (1975) suggested that organizations emphasized different 
functional problems at different organizational stages of developmental. Initially, organizations 
focused on adaptation to the external environment, followed by resource acquisition and the 
development of workflow procedures. The emphasis of organizations then changed to goal 
attainment, efficient outcomes, and in the last stage moved to maintenance and 
institutionalization of the structure.  
Quinn and Cameron (1983) developed a lifecycle-effectiveness model where different 
criteria of effectiveness were needed to determine the different stages of the organizational 
lifecycle. Based on the Quinn and Rohrbaugh model (1983), Quinn and Cameron determined 
that criteria from various models were of greater importance when used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of organizational development at various stages. The open-systems criteria of 
effectiveness, for example, are more important in the entrepreneurial stage, where flexibility, 
readiness, and resource acquisition are critical. In the formalization and control stages of 
organization, the rational goal model is more appropriate as it includes goal accomplishment, 
productivity, and efficiency.   
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Conceptual Framework of the Study 
Agency theory, one of the main theories for organizational behavior, explains the 
probable effects of an outcome-based contract on hospital performance (Figure 1). I based this 
study on the positivist and principal-agent theories to postulates a strong conceptual and 
theoretical framework for understanding the associations between the study variables: the 
association between the BPCI initiative and hospital performance. This study uses the metaphor 
of the BPCI initiative to illustrate the relationship between CMS and a hospital (Keeley, 1980).  
The principal in this study is CMS, delegating work to an agent (hospital) under a new outcome-
based contract (the BPCI initiative) to govern their relationship. Since participation in this 
initiative is voluntarily and hospitals need to apply to participate, the BPCI initiative is 
considered as a contract between the hospital and CMS rather than a regulation. Based on 
positivist agency theory, I describe the effectiveness of the BPCI initiative as a governance 
mechanism to control the self-interest behavior of the hospital. One of the main problems in 
accelerated healthcare costs are the conflicting goals between providers (agents) and payers 
(principals). A hospital has an incentive to overuse services while the goal of CMS is to reduce 
the cost of care and increase its quality—value-based care. To limit overuse by the hospital while 
increasing quality of care, CMS initiated an episode-based payment called the BPCI initiative in 
2011. The initiative included all related services for a single patient for a given diagnosis. Under 
the BPCI initiative, the hospital is expected to offer financial inducements that lead to efficient, 
effective results, and not to the number of services that can be performed.  
Principal-agent theory explains the BPCI initiative as a solution to control a hospital’s 
moral hazard behavior. For example, hospital use is so complex that CMS cannot detect what the 
hospital is actually doing. The hospital may overuse its services against the interest of CMS. 
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Under the BPCI initiative Model 2, CMS uses an information system that sets a target price for 
each episode of care and for each participating hospital. The purpose is to encourage the hospital 
to align its performance with the interests of the principal (CMS) and reduce moral hazard.  
Since CMS can verify the hospital’s performance by comparing it to the target price calculated 
by CMS, the hospital is motivated to restrain hospital use.  
According to principal-agent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), it is important to note that the 
BPCI initiative is an outcome-based, not a behavior-based contract. First, hospital uses are not 
programmed tasks. Programmed tasks are behaviors that can be specifically defined (Eisenhardt, 
1988, 1989). The hospital check-in desk is a highly programmed service that requires a small set 
of well-defined behaviors, such as regularity and properly executing administrative work; the 
outcome behavior is easy to evaluate. Conversely, hospital services for an episode of care are not 
precisely defined. For example, different hospitals may have different implant costs and care 
coordination programs for MJRL. Therefore, an outcome-based contract motivates hospitals to 
behave in the interest of the CMS, though their actual behaviors are not clearly evaluated by 
CMS. Second, the outcomes of hospital performance are measurable in terms of effectiveness 
and efficiency. LOS, discharge location after an episode of care, in-hospital mortality, 
complications, total charges, and average charge per hospital day are readily measured as 
outcomes, so the outcome-based contracts of the BPCI initiative are more attractive. Third, as 
CMS becomes more risk averse in healthcare cost, it becomes more attractive to pass risk to the 
hospital through gainsharing and penalties contained in an outcome-based contract. For this 
study, I adopted two propositions from Eisenhardt (1989) to examine the behavior of a hospital 
in the context of the outcome-based contract of the BPCI initiative Model 2 (Figure 6): 
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Proposition 1. When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome 
based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 
Proposition 2. When the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the 
agent is more likely to behave in interests of the principal.  
(Eisenhardt, 1989) 
 
Summary of Predictions from the Theoretical Model 
In summary, agency theory provides a conceptual framework of organizational behaviors 
that enables us to study potential effects of the BPCI initiative on hospital performance. CMS 
established the BPCI initiative to minimize conflicts of interests between CMS and hospitals by 
aligning the hospital’s incentive with that of CMS: value-based care. To test effects of the 
contract (the BPCI initiative) governing the relationship between principal (CMS) and agent 
(hospital) in conflicting goals, my study measures the agent’s performance in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency in response to the outcome-based contract (Figure 7).    
Further, my study evaluates if the agent behaves differently for surgical care versus non-
surgical medical care when responding to the same contract. Based on agency theory, four 
hypotheses are formed to examine the hospital performance for surgical (MJRL) and medical 
care (sepsis) under the BPCI initiative (Figure 8). 
 
Hypothesis 1.  BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the effectiveness 
of hospital performance than non-participating hospitals. 
 H1a. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the effectiveness of 
surgical care than non-participating hospitals. 
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 H1b. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the effectiveness of 
medical care than non-participating hospitals. 
 
Hypothesis 2. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the efficiency of 
hospital performance than non-participating hospitals.  
 H2a. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the efficiency of 
surgical care than non-participating hospitals. 
 H2b. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the efficiency of 







 This chapter introduces the research design, followed by a discussion of the data and 
sample being used in this study. Finally, the measurement of variables is described and the 
analytical approaches used to test hypotheses are explained. 
 
Research Design 
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of the BPCI initiative on hospital 
performance in Nevada. The study design enables me to investigate associations between the 
independent and dependent variables. 
This study was based on a quasi-experimental design. It was a pre- and post-study with 
both non-randomized intervention and comparison groups. The intervention was the 
implementation of the bundled payment approach. The intervention group included discharges 
from hospitals that participated in Phase 2 of the BPCI initiative Model 2 for MJRL and sepsis 
episodes of care. The comparison group included discharges from those hospitals that did not 
participate in Phase 2 of the BPCI initiative Model 2. The unit of analysis was hospital discharge.  
Hospitals that only participated in Phase I were included in a comparison group. Under the BPCI 
initiative Model 2, eight awardees representing ten hospitals in phase I participated in the risk-
bearing phase of the initiative, Phase II. The analysis included eight hospitals present during both 
pre- and post- intervention periods. From SIDN data files, this study identified nine acute care 
hospitals that did not participate in the BPCI initiative in Nevada. This allowed the same cohort 
to be followed over the course of the study.   
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SIDN was used for several reasons: (a) it is the only Nevada state representative database 
that contains discharge information, (b) it includes a diverse sample of participants, (c) it 
provides a range of hospital care information such as diagnoses and procedures, and (d) it 




State Inpatient Database of Nevada.  
The SIDN was mainly used for this study. It includes inpatient discharge records from all 
non-federal community hospitals in Nevada. For each hospital discharge, the SIDN contains 
information such as one principal diagnosis, 25 secondary diagnoses, 15 procedures, admission 
and discharge status, patient demographics characteristics, expected payment source, total 
charges, and LOS. The SIDN data also contain some hospital-level variables. The SIDN are 
calendar-year files based on discharge date. For this study, SIDN data were obtained from the 
Center for Health Information Analysis for Nevada. All patient identifiers were removed from 
the SIDN (HCUP, 2018).   
 
Sample. 
 This study used 2013–2017 SIDN data. The 2017 data were the latest publicly available 
at the time of the study. The unit of analysis was hospital discharge. 
 
The BPCI initiative in Nevada. 
 In Nevada, 15 health care facilities participated in the BPCI initiatives Model 2 and 
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Model 3 (CMS, 2017f). As of July 1, 2018, 11 acute care hospitals and one physician group 
practice participated in Model 2, and three inpatient rehabilitation facilities and one hospitalist 
participated in Model 3 (CMS, 2018a). There were no BPCI initiative Model 1 participants in 
Nevada.  For the BPCI initiative Model 2, all 10 acute care hospitals participated in Phase1 for 
the MJRL and sepsis episodes of care in March 7, 2014 or June 20, 2014.  Phase I ended 
September 30, 2015.  Two of 10 initiating acute care hospitals did not transit to Phase 2, which is 
comparable to a CMS report that about 20% of hospitals that began the Phase 1 Model 2 
withdrew completely from the BPCI initiative (CMS, 2018b). Seven BPCI initiative participants 
began Phase 2 in the MJRL episode of care either on April 1 or October 1, 2015. For sepsis, four 
acute care hospitals began Phase 2 either on April 1 or July 1, 2015. Phase 2 ended September 30, 
2018. The episode of care included all related services during the care and 90 days following 
hospital discharge. All the BPCI initiative Model 2 participants in Nevada negotiated the target 
price at a two percent discount rate based on three years of Medicare claims data for the 
participants (CMS, 2018a). Three participants used the three-day hospital waiver for Medicare 
SNF coverage (CMS, 2017e).  
  
BPCI initiative Model 2 participating hospitals. 
This study obtained publicly available lists from CMS of hospitals participating in the 
BPCI initiative. The lists included names of hospitals participating in the BPCI initiative Model 
2, the episodes of care each hospital participated in, their start date, and the date they planned to 
terminate participation in Phase 1 and Phase 2. From these lists, the study identified hospitals 
enrolled in Model 2 by April 1, 2015 for the MJRL and sepsis episodes of care in Nevada (Table 
2). Model 2-participating hospitals in Nevada included profit and nonprofit acute care hospitals.   
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The primary interest of this study was in hospitals that agreed to participate in Phase 2 of 
the BPCI initiative Model 2. Phase 2-participating hospitals entered into risk-bearing agreements 
with CMS instead of terminating the BPCI initiative after the Phase 1 preparation phase. Model 2 
included all related hospital (parts A) and physician (part B) payments, allowing for the broadest 
definition of an episode of care (Tsai et al., 2015). For simplicity, this study referred to the 
analytic sample of hospitals participating under Phase 2 of Model 2 simply as “the BPCI 
initiative participants.” 
This study selected conflicting definitions for the two phases. Phase 1, non-risk-bearing 
hospitals that chose not to join Phase 2 were classified as non-participating hospitals. Phase 1- 
and Phase 2-participating hospitals were classified as participating hospitals. Of these two main 
groups in our analytic sample the participants included three nonprofit and five for-profit acute 
care hospitals, and the nonparticipants included six for-profit, two nonprofit acute hospitals, and 
one county hospital (Table 2). In my study, the BPCI initiative participating hospitals, BPCI-
participating hospitals, and participating hospitals were interchangeably used to indicate the 
BPCI initiative Model 2 Participating Hospitals.   
 
Comparison hospitals.  
 This study identified comparison hospitals from the publicly available lists of CMS and 
SIDN data. All hospitals that received payments from CMS for MJRL (DRG 469 and 470) and 
sepsis (DRG 870, 871, and 872) were selected, except BPCI-participating hospitals in Nevada.  
This study included 10 comparison hospitals for MJRL and 13 hospitals for sepsis (Table 3). 
 
Study period.  
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The study period covered the 27 to 33 months before each hospital started the bundled 
payment, with the intervention period beginning immediately after the start date (Table 2). The 
post-intervention period ranged from 29 to 33 months depending on the Phase 2 BPCI initiative 
Model 2 enrollment date. For MJRL, hospitals that started the Phase 2 BPCI initiative in April 
2015 had a 33-month intervention period; those that started in October 2015 had a 27-month 
intervention period. For sepsis, the BPCI initiative participating hospitals had a 33-month or 30-
month intervention period depending on whether the hospital started the Phase 2 BPCI initiative 
in April 2015 or July 2015, respectively (Table 2). It should be noted that the pre- and post-
intervention period varied between MJRL and sepsis as well as across hospitals in the 
intervention group. Table 2 describes details of the start and end dates for both MJRL and sepsis 
episodes of care for each participating hospital.   
First, this study excluded samples between different intervention periods across hospitals 
for both MJRL and sepsis in order to limit the number of different pre- and post-intervention 
periods. For MJRL, samples between April 1, 2015 and October 1, 2015 were excluded (Figure 
8). October 1, 2015 was regarded as the intervention period for MJRL across hospitals in the 
intervention and comparison groups. For sepsis, samples between April 1, 2015 and July 1, 2015 
were removed (Figure 9). This study used July 1, 2015 as the intervention period for sepsis.  
Second, different time intervals were examined for MJRL and sepsis. For sepsis, this 
study examined the entire time period, from 33 months before to 30 months after the BPCI 
initiative. For MJRL, a narrow interval (24 months before and after the BPCI initiative) around 
the treatment was tested to show the significant effect of the treatment. Since the BPCI initiative 
was not randomly assigned, minimizing the chances of other unobserved differences affecting 




Patient selection and sample size.   
Discharges were identified for MJRL by the MS-DRG codes 469 and 470 and for sepsis 
by the MS-DRG codes 870–872. Specifically, MJRL was defined as a set of diagnosis-related 
group (DRG) codes with major complications or comorbidity (MCC) (DRG469) and MJRL 
without MCC (DRG470) (Appendix A). Sepsis was defined as a set of DRG codes for 
septicemia or severe sepsis with mechanical ventilation for 96+ hours (DRG 870), septicemia or 
severe sepsis without mechanical ventilation for 96+ hours w/ MCC (DRG 871), and septicemia 
or severe sepsis without mechanical ventilation for 96+ hours without MCC (DRG 872), as 
identified by CMS (Appendix A). 
Figure 9 illustrates steps of the sample selection process for this study. A total of 285,250 
discharges were identified from SIDN as Medicare Beneficiaries from 2013 to 2017. Patients 
were included in the data analysis if they were diagnosed with either MJRL or sepsis, according 
to the MS-DRGs. A total of 10,006 episodes of MJRL and 18,360 episodes of sepsis were 
identified and included in the data analysis. This study excluded patients who were treated 
between the two different implementation dates. For example, some hospitals implemented the 
BPCI initiative for MJRL on April 1, 2015 and some began on October 1, 2015. This left 8,870 
discharges for MJRL and 17,356 discharges for sepsis episode of care. I further excluded outliers 
of LOS (if LOS was longer than 60 days) and total charge/costs (if total charge/costs was $0) 
from both MJRL and sepsis. A total of 13 and 89 discharges from MJRL and sepsis were 
removed, respectively. The final study sample of 8,870 for MJRL and 17,356 for sepsis were  
included in the data analysis. The unit of analysis was the discharge. 
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Measurement of Variables 
Variables were carefully selected according to the conceptual framework (Figure 1) and 
scientific literature. There were three groups of variables: (a) dependent variables of 
effectiveness, (b) dependent variables of efficiency, and (c) independent variables. Control 
variables functioned as independent variables in the regression models, but were not specified in 
the conceptual framework; no testable hypotheses were suggested for the control variables. Table 
4 lists the definitions and type of variables used in this study. 
 
Dependent variables: effectiveness measures. 
According to Scott (2003), organizational structure determines the effectiveness of an 
organization in terms of profitability, adaptability, and flexibility. In my study, discharge 
locations, in-hospital mortality, and complications were selected to measure the effectiveness of 
hospital performance responding to an outcome-based contract, the BPCI initiative, since 
outcomes of these variables were highly associated with coordinated and collaborative hospital 
care (CMS, 2018b; Dummit et al., 2016; Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2017; Froemke et 
al., 2015; Iorio et al., 2016).   
 
Discharge location.  
  Discharge location was commonly considered in studying the effectiveness of hospital 
performance, since discharge location was not an end point of hospital care, but rather a 
transitional care that required an integration of care (CMS Bundled Payments for Care 
Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018; 
Dundon et al., 2016; Figueroa, Zhou, & Jha, 2019; Froemke et al., 2015; Siddiqi et al., 2017; 
 45 
Waring et al., 2014). Transitional care has often been decided by a physician, without hospital 
input. Home discharge has been encouraged not only to reduce health care cost, but also to 
increase value of care. The National Inpatient State (NIS) database defines home discharge as a 
routine disposition outcome since going home is a desirable end point of hospital care (Sharma, 
Sonig, Ambekar, & Nanda, 2014; Sonig, Khan, Wadhwa, Thakur, & Nanda, 2012). It has been 
found that discharge to a SNF for MJRL was associated with higher complications and higher 
readmissions than home discharge, which generally reflects an undesirable outcome of care 
(Iorio et al., 2016; McLawhorn & Buller, 2017). Enhancing patient empowerment started in-
hospital is an important factor for discharging patients to home, but it is only possible with 
improved care coordination (Braet, Weltens, & Sermeus, 2016; Waring et al., 2014). Developing 
a care-coordination program for MJRL has had a positive association with home discharge rather 
than discharging patients to SNF (Dundon et al., 2016). Further, studies have shown that 
including physicians in developing an effective clinical pathway is highly associated with home 
discharges (Froemke et al., 2015; McLawhorn & Buller, 2017; Siddiqi et al., 2017).  
Therefore, my study evaluated discharge location to measure the effectiveness of hospital 
performance using the variable “home” since this discharge requires an effective organizational 
structure to streamline value-based care. The variable was recoded as dichotomous, with a 
discharge location to home coded “1” and a patient discharge to other locations coded zero. 
 
In-hospital mortality. 
In-hospital mortality is a validated outcome to measure effectiveness of hospital 
performance. Jha et al. (2007) showed higher hospital performance was associated with lower 
mortality (Jha, Orav, Li, & Epstein, 2007). For example, early diagnosis and immediate 
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treatment are especially important in reducing hospital deaths for patients treated with sepsis.  
However, even with the structure of mandated protocols, more rapid completion of a sepsis care 
bundle and administration of antibiotics are highly associated with reducing in-hospital mortality 
(Seymour et al., 2017). In order to deliver time-sensitive treatment such as a sepsis care bundle, 
education of all stakeholders involved in sepsis treatment and an effective organizational 
structure are required. Studies have shown a decrease in in-hospital mortality at the BPCI 
initiative participating hospitals after a MJRL procedure (CMS, 2018b; Dummit et al., 2016; 
Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2017; Froemke et al., 2015; Iorio et al., 2016; Joynt Maddox 
et al., 2018).  However, there has been a concern that lower mortality might be associated with 
an increase in discharging high-risk patients; hospitals might be able to lower in-hospital 
mortality by discharging high-risk patients to other facilities. This variable was recoded as 
dichotomous, with in-hospital mortality coded as “1” if a patient died during hospitalization and 
zero if the patient did not. 
  
Complications . 
Reducing complications is important in increasing the effectiveness of hospital care 
(DesHarnais, McMahon, Wroblewski, & Hogan, 1990). However, categories of complication 
vary depending on the type of care patients received and how each complication was linked to 
each procedure (Romano, Chan, Schembri, & Rainwater, 2002). For example, some studies 
measured postoperative complications identified by the Complication Screening Project, which 
includes postoperative infection, urinary and renal infection, pulmonary embolism, and blood 
transfusion to measure complication after an MJRL procedure (Froemke et al., 2015; Nichols & 
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Vose, 2016; Regenbogen et al., 2017). The CMS uses heart attack, pneumonia, sepsis, and 
mechanical complications to measure the complication rate for MJRL (Medicare.gov, 2018).   
The CMS developed a set of indicators called Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) to provide 
information about potential hospital complications following procedures (AHRQ, 2017d). To my 
knowledge, few studies have used PSIs to determine complications. However, a recent CMS 
bundled payment model rationalizes using PSIs to measure complication of care. The next-
generation CMS bundled payment model following the BPCI initiative, BPCI-Advanced, 
includes PSIs as mandatary outcome measurements. My study used PSI 03, PSI 08, and PSI 13. 
PSI 03 is a pressure ulcer rating applied to both medical and surgical discharge and defined by a 
specific MS-DRG (AHRQ, 2017a). MS-DRG 469 and 470 for MJRL and MS-DRG 870–872 for 
sepsis were included. Pressure ulcers are caused by pressure over a bony prominence causing a 
localized area of tissue damage. A major risk factor for developing pressure ulcers is reduced 
mobility, leaving a patient in one position for a long period of time for example (Wake, 2010).  
 Therefore, the incidence of pressure ulcers is often considered one of many aspects of 
patient care that involves nurses and physicians (Wake, 2010). There is a limitation to using PSI 
03 to measure potential complications for sepsis. Earlier studies on sepsis have shown that the 
most serious complication of a pressure ulcer is sepsis (Galpin, Chow, Bayer, & Guze, 1976; 
Lyder, 2010). Therefore, in my study I identified a pressure ulcer not as a primary diagnosis, but 
measured it as a complication variable for both MJRL and sepsis. PSI 08 is the incidence of 
hospital falls with a resulting hip fracture as defined by specific MS-DRGs, including DRG 469 
and 470 (AHRQ, 2017b). PSI 13 indicates a postoperative sepsis rate for surgical discharge 
defined by specific MS-DRGs including MS-DRG 469 and 470 (AHRQ, 2017a, 2017c). PSI 
total indicates the incidence of PSI 03, PSI 08, or PSI 13. All PSIs are defined by ICD-9-CM and 
 48 
ICD-10-CM diagnosis codes. For my study, incidence of pressure ulcer (PSI 03) was measured 
for sepsis-related complications and the PSI total was used to measure complications in cases of 
MJRL. Appendix D lists ICD-9-CM and ICD-10 codes for each PSI. Complication variables, PSI 
03, PSI 08, or PSI 13 and PSI total were recorded as dichotomous, with a value of “1” if yes, 
zero if otherwise.   
 
  Dependent variables: efficiency measures. 
 Efficiency is defined as the time and resource consumption required for patients to 
recover. It is measured by the average length of stay, total patient charges per discharge, and 
average patient charge per day. 
 
Length of in-hospital stay. 
The length of in-hospital stays is often used to measure efficiency of hospital care since a 
shorter LOS is highly associated with reducing the hospital cost per discharge (Froemke et al., 
2015; Iorio et al., 2016; Regenbogen et al., 2017; Siddiqi et al., 2017). However, a shorter LOS 
may result in other adverse effects. More patients could be directed to a SNF from early 
discharge, which leads to an increase in cost of care. A reduction in discharging patients to a 
SNF was found to be a large portion of cost reduction in the BPCI initiative (CMS, 2018b; 
Dundon et al., 2016; Iorio et al., 2016). Since the Model 2 BPCI initiative includes all costs of 
care including PAC, I assume LOS will be a valid efficiency indicator to measure the effect of 
the BPCI initiative. The variable LOS is measured in days. This study excluded any patients with 
 a LOS longer than 60 days. 
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Total charge per discharge. 
Total cost has been used as a main indicator to measure efficiency of hospital 
performance (Jha, Orav, Dobson, Book, & Epstein, 2009; Russo & Adler, 2015). Lower total 
costs, with an assumption of the same quality of care, indicate hospitals are providing efficient 
care. Most studies of the BPCI initiative have reported a reduction in total cost of Medicare 
payments at BPCI initiative participating hospitals for MJRL using a standardized care pathway, 
but not for sepsis (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 
Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018; Courtney et al., 2016; Dummit et al., 2016; 
Edwards et al., 2017; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018). However, these studies used total claimed bills 
(total charge) from insurance claim data as a proxy for cost instead of measuring cost directly 
(Finkler, 1982; Shen et al., 2018; Stoller et al., 2016). The charge represents the amount billed to 
the payer but does not reflect the actual cost for hospital services. Finkler (1982) argued that use 
of charges as a proxy for economic cost may lead to unjustified conclusions about efficiency of 
care (Finkler, 1982). Since use of charge as a proxy for cost has been viewed as inadequately 
estimating the economic cost of care (Ashby, 1992; Finkler, 1982), my study measured total 
charges from the SIDN database to evaluate efficiency of hospital performance. The hospital 
total charge was adjusted to the annual hospital inflation rate (Martin, Hartman, Washington, & 
Catlin, 2019), but was not converted to cost. Analysis of total charges is important since that is 
the amount being claimed to Medicare (Finkler, 1982). The variable Total Charge is measured in 
dollars.  This study excludes patients with no charges. 
 
Average charge per hospital day. 
Average charge per day is a relevant measure of the efficiency of hospital performance 
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since it’s a composite measure of two variables of efficiency measurement: LOS and total charge 
(Butler, 1995). The average charge per day is determined by dividing total charge by LOS.  
Therefore, average charge per day decreases when LOS increases with the same total charge, or 
when total charge decreases with the same LOS. Reductions of both total charge and LOS are the 
most desirable scenario for decreasing the average charge per hospital day. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine effects of the BPCI initiative on average charges per 
day. Average charge is determined by dividing total charge by LOS for each discharge. The 
variable Average Charge is measured in dollars. 
 
Independent variables: the BPCI initiative.  
A contract was measured by the implementation of the BPCI initiative. It is a binary 
variable with the value of “1” if a given patient was treated after the BPCI initiative was 
implemented and zero if the patient was not. 
 
Control Variables. 
Since this study was not an experimental design based on randomization, using control 
variables was important to consider potential confounding factors in data analysis. Several 
patient- and hospital-level variables frequently used in prior studies are included in the 
multivariable analysis. First, patient and hospital characteristics before the BPCI initiative might 
have been different than after the BPCI initiative. Second, even though the relevant patient and 
hospital characteristics did not change, by including them the error of variance may be reduced, 
leading to a smaller standard error (Wooldridge, 2015). The patient-level variables, or patient 
characteristics, include age, sex, race/ethnicity, and comorbidities. Hospital-level variables or 
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hospital characteristics include hospital size (measured by the number of beds) and hospital 
ownership (i.e., for-profit private, non-for-profit, and public). Teaching hospital status was not 
included in the data analysis as it is highly correlated with hospital ownership status. Hospital 
rural/urban status was not included in the data analysis because there were no rural hospitals 
participating in the BPCI initiative.  
 
Patient characteristics.  
The set of variables that represent patient characteristics included age, sex, race/ethnicity, 
and comorbidities. These variables are important in adjusting patient mix when multivariable 
analyses are performed.   
 
Age. 
Age is closely related to clinical process and outcome (DesHarnais et al., 1990; Figueroa 
et al., 2019). The mean age of Medicare beneficiaries who underwent MJRL was 75 years 
(Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). From a DiD analysis of 2011–2015 Medicare claims, 
Navathe et al. (2018) showed a 0.23% reduction in patients over 85 years old in BPCI-
participating hospitals (Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). Patient-level independent variables 
were derived from SIDN and included the following: 64 years old and younger, 65–74, 75–84, 
and 85 and older. 
 
Sex. 
Sex is a commonly used variable that relates to health care outcomes, including hospital 
care (DesHarnais et al., 1990; Figueroa et al., 2019). Among Medicare beneficiaries, women 
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(64%) were more likely receive MJRL than men (Froemke et al., 2015; Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, 
et al., 2018). However, fewer women received MJRL at BPCI-participating hospitals than non-
participating hospitals. The patient-level independent variables, Male and Female, were derived 
from the SIDN. 
 
Race/ethnicity. 
Racial/ethnic disparities exist in healthcare across a variety of clinical conditions and 
procedures (DesHarnais et al., 1990; Figueroa et al., 2019). Navathe et al. (2018) observed that 
95% of Medicare beneficiaries who had MJRLs were of nonblack race/ethnicity according to 
2011–2015 Medicare claims (Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). Navathe et al. (2018) also 
showed a small reduction of black patients (-0.14%) at BPCI-participating hospitals after BPCI 
implementation. Patient-level independent variables were derived from SIDN and included the 
following: Native American, Asian, Pacific Islander, Black, White, Hispanic, Others (unknown). 
 
Comorbidities. 
Risk adjustment taking into account patient sociodemographics and comorbidities is 
crucial in outcome research. Comorbidities are often negatively related to outcome (DesHarnais 
et al., 1990; Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). Navathe et al. (2018) found there was a small 
reduction in most comorbidity for MJRL at BPCI-participating hospitals except for alcohol use, 
depression, and psychoses (Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). Tested comorbidities were: 
high complexity (-0.15%), obesity (-0.12%), diabetes (-0.22%), diabetes with complications (-
0.13%), coronary artery disease (-0.21%), and congestive heart failure (-0.07%) (Navathe, Liao, 
Dykstra, et al., 2018). Based on Quan et al. (2005), comorbidities were defined in ICD-9-CM 
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and ICD-10 codes and patient-level independent variables were derived from SIDN, including 
the following: diabetes, diabetes with complications, hypertension, congestive heart failures, 
COPD, depression, and obesity (Quan et al., 2005). Appendix C lists ICD-9-CM and ICD-10 
codes for each comorbidity.  
 
Hospital characteristics. 
The set of variables that indicate hospital characteristics includes hospital size and 
ownership of the hospital. The variables were highly associated with participation in the BPCI 
initiative Model 2. Since all hospitals included in this study were urban, a variable differentiating 
rural hospitals was not included.  
 
Hospital size. 
Hospital size is commonly considered in studying hospital behavior and performance 
(Liao et al., 2019; Tsai et al., 2015). With BPCI, studies have found that BPCI-participating 
hospitals were generally larger than non-participating hospitals (Joynt Maddox et al., 2018; Tsai 
et al., 2015). Tsai et al (2015) reported 35.5% of BPCI hospitals had more than 400 beds while 
11.6% of non-BPCI hospitals had the same number of beds (Tsai et al., 2015). Dummit et al. 
(2016), Navathe et al. (2018), and Joynt Maddox et al. (2018) supported the association between 
BPCI-participating hospitals and hospital size. BPCI hospitals had a greater number of beds than 
non-BPCI hospitals for both MJRL and medical conditions (mean number of beds, 324 vs 213, 
respectively) (Joynt Maddox et al., 2018; Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018).  
For this study, number of beds was derived from the American Hospital Association file. 
Hospital-level independent variables were derived from SIDN and included the following: small 
 54 
(less than 100 beds), medium (between 100 and 300 beds), and large (more than 300 beds). 
 
Ownership of the hospital. 
Many studies have shown that hospital behavior and performance vary among hospitals 
with different types of ownership (Liao et al., 2019; Tsai et al., 2015). Hospital ownership is 
generally classified into three types: for-profit, nonprofit, and public.  Studies have found 
associations between the BPCI initiative participating hospitals and hospital ownership. BPCI 
hospitals were more likely than non-BPCI hospitals to be nonprofit (Joynt Maddox et al., 2018; 
Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018; Tsai et al., 2015). Based on April 2014 Medicare claims, 
82.2% of BPCI hospitals and 58.1% of non-BPCI hospitals were nonprofit (Tsai et al., 2015). 
Another study reported a 2.3% increase in patients who were treated in nonprofit hospitals after 
BPCI (Dummit et al., 2016). Hospital-level independent variables were derived from SIDN and 
included the following structural variables: profit, nonprofit, or county. 
 
Analytical Approaches 
The difference-in-differences (DiD) method was the core analytical approach used in this 
study. 
 
The Difference-in-differences method. 
To evaluate the impact of policy implementation, pre-post policy and participant-
nonparticipant approaches are often used. Pre-post assessment compares changes of outcomes 
from the same individuals or communities before and after policy implementation. Participant-
nonparticipant comparisons compare outcomes of participants in the policy to nonparticipants.  
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However, there were important limitations to consider. First, developments not related to a 
change in policy may be present. For example, if changes in a factor like patient outcomes were 
in the process of improving before implementation of the new policy, a pre-post study may 
wrongly conclude that the improvement was due in part to the new policy. Second, selection bias 
may exist. The Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method addresses these limitations by using a 
comparison group not exposed to the policy change but experiencing the same time trends 
(Dimick & Ryan, 2014; Wooldridge, 2015) 
The DiD method compares outcomes of pre-post policy implementation between 
treatment and comparison groups to minimize the bias of unobserved factors that could affect 
outcomes and that change with the treatment. Therefore, differences in outcomes pre- and post-
policy implementation in the group exposed to the policy (treatment group) and in the group not 
exposed the policy (comparison group), are changes in outcomes related to the policy 
implementation without the effect of unobserved time trends. If unobserved factors also affected 
the comparison group, then double-differencing can remove the bias and isolate the treatment 
effect. Therefore, policy effect is estimated by DiD.   
 
The DiD estimator (  ) is: 
                      (1) 
 
Where, 
 δ represents effect of policy of the average outcome of Y, 
 shows average outcomes, 
 treatment represents a group exposed the policy, 
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 comparison represents a group did not exposed to the policy, 
 pre represents before policy implementation, 
 post represents after policy implementation. 
 
The DiD estimate is equal to zero if there is no association between policy 
implementation and subsequent outcomes (Figure 10A).  If there is an association, the DiD 
estimate will show an improvement in the treatment group (Figure 10B).   
 According to the PubMed database, more studies in health policy and medicine are using 
the DiD method (Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015).  These studies include: the impact of health 
insurance expansions under the affordable care act (Zhu, Brawarsky, Lipsitz, Huskamp, & Haas, 
2010), payment policy changes and financial incentives (Song et al., 2011), impact of the 
American College of Surgeons National Surgical Quality Improvement Program on clinical 
outcomes (Rajaram et al., 2014), implementation of an electronic health record (McCullough, 
Christianson, & Leerapan, 2013), and the Massachusetts Health Reform on Joint Replacement 
Use (Hanchate et al., 2015). A DiD study was also used to identify the impact of the BPCI 
initiative implementation (CMS, 2018b; Dummit et al., 2016; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018; 
Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). 
Regression models are used to test the significance of DiD estimates rather than simple 
subtraction as they adjust for control variables (patient demographics or hospital characteristics) 
that may differ among groups (Ryan et al., 2015; Wooldridge, 2015). In addition to standard 
statistical assumptions, “common shocks” and “parallel trends” assumptions need to undergo 
DiD analysis (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Mazurenko, Shen, Shan, & Greenway, 2018; Ryan et al., 
2015; Wooldridge, 2015). The common shock hypothesis assumes that the treatment and 
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comparison groups will be similarly affected by events occurring before, during, or after 
treatment. Parallel trends, however, assumes that pretreatment outcomes between the treatment 
and comparison groups will be similar (Figure 10). This leads to the assumption that any 
outcomes between the two groups that differ must be due to the new policy. Another important 
assumption is that the composition of the two groups must remain stable (Ryan et al., 2015).   
 
Econometric frameworks. 
To evaluate the agent’s behavior or performance, this study applied “micro-level” DiD in 
which data exist at a lower level nested within the treatment unit (e.g., individual-level variables) 
within the agent (i.e., organization) (Ryan et al., 2015). For individual i in organization j at time t 
with two groups (treatment and comparison group) and two time periods (pre- and post), baseline 
DiD models of this study take the form:  
               (2) 
 
Where, 
  represents an outcome variable for a dependent variable for individual © of 
organization j in time t, 
  is a dummy variable for whether an individual occurred in the post-BPCI 
period,  
  is a dummy variable indicating the value of one if an individual is getting 
treated in the BPCI-hospitals, zero otherwise, 
  represents impact of the BPCI initiative on changes in outcomes, 
  is a vector of control variables for sex, race, age, and comorbidity, 
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  is the idiosyncratic error term. 
 
This study has multiple treatment and comparison hospitals in the treatment and 
comparison groups. Therefore, estimated differences in the treatment (or comparison) group 
before and after the BPCI initiative could be due to a single hospital with substantially more 
observations if all the treated or control hospitals were viewed as one hospital (2). In order to 
estimate before and after changes “within” hospitals and then determine an average, this study 
replaces the variable “Treat” with a complete set of dummy variables for each hospital (e.g., 
hospital fixed effects) (3). 
,          (3) 
where is a vector of organization fixed effects. Likewise, it is common to allow a more 
flexible fitment of the variable “post” by replacing it with a complete set of time-fixed effects (4).  
Therefore, the main framework was a DiD specification:  
                            ,                               (4) 
where the outcome variable was one of the following variables: Homeift, a dummy 
variable that equals “1” if the patient is discharged to home, or zero if otherwise; HHSijt, a 
dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient is discharged to home under home health services, 
or zero if otherwise; SNFijt is a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient is discharged to 
skilled nursing facility, or zero if otherwise; mortalityijt is a dummy variable that equals “1” if the 
patient is deceased in the hospital, or zero if otherwise; LOSijt is a continuous variable of the 
number of days the patient stays in the hospital after the episode of care; PSI03ijt is a dummy 
variable that equals “1” if the patient has a pressure ulcer after the episode of care, or zero if 
otherwise; PSI08ijt is a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient has an in-hospital fall with 
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hip fracture after the episode of care, or zero if otherwise; PSItotalijt is a dummy variable that 
equals “1” if the patient has either a pressure ulcer or in hospital fall with hip fracture after the 
episode of care, or zero if otherwise; TotalChargeijt is a continuous variable that measures the 
average total charge for the patient; AverageChargeijt is a continuous variable that measures the 
average charge per hospital day for the patient. 
 Here,  was an indicator variable set equal to “1” for any individual in our sample 
treated in the BPCI initiative participating hospital, and zero if otherwise.  was an 
indicator variable set equal to “1” for any individual in our sample that was treated after the 
implementation of the BPCI initiative. Further,  was a set of hospital fixed effects and  was a 
complete set of month-year fixed effects. And then, was a set of demographic controls that 
included the following characteristics: age categories (less than 65 years old, 75–84, 85 and older, 
and 65–74 were omitted); a binary variable indicating if the patient was male; and a set of 
categorical variables indicating the patient’s race/ethnicity (Black, Hispanic, Asian, and others; 
White was the omitted category); a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed 
with diabetes without complications; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was 
diagnosed with diabetes with complications; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was 
diagnosed with hypertension; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed with 
congestive heart failure; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed with 
COPD; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed with depression; and a 
dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed with obesity. This study used the 
OLS model for the impact on home, mortality, LOS, PSI 03, PSI 08, PSI 13, PSI total, total 
 charge, and average charge. 
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 The parameter , which is the parameter of interest, is the coefficient estimate of the 
treatment group post the BPCI initiative interaction term. It estimates the effect of the BPCI 
initiative on the average outcome of  . The term  is estimated by computing the differences 
in average among the treatment (5-7) and comparison groups (8-10) in each time period, and 
then differences in the results over time (11,12). 
                          (4) 
Changes in Treatment Group  
            =                  (5) 
              =                                                                                              (6) 
                                                                      (7) 
Changes in Comparison Group  
 =                (8) 
              =                                        (9) 
               =  0                                     (10 
           
 Therefore, DiD estimates = (7) – (10)  
                 =                                       (11) 
                                   (12) 
This study will make several estimated variations of the pre-BPCI initiative to check for 
robustness (Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018): a generalized linear regression including 
patient demographics (age, race, sex, comorbidities) and hospital characteristics (ownership, 
hospital size) as controls, and time and hospital as fixed effects.  
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Difference-in-differences assumptions.  
Based on the DiD checklist proposed by Ryan et al. (2015) in Table 4, three assumptions 
were tested.  First, this study used data on the outcomes from both treatment and comparison 
groups before and after the interventions were implemented.  Second, pre-trends in outcomes 
between treatment and comparison groups were tested.  Since the BPCI initiative was not 
randomly assigned, this study could not explicitly test parallel trends between BPCI-hospitals 
and non-BPCI hospitals prior to intervention.  This study, however, could test if the trends in 
outcomes leading up to the BPCI initiative statistically differed between the treatment and the 
comparison groups (McCoy et al., 2017).  This study confined its attention to individual samples 
before the BPCI initiative and constructed Months Since BPCIijt to represent the number of 




                                                                 (13) 
The coefficient of interest for the pre-trend test was derived from:  
Changes in Treatment Group:  
 
  
Changes in Comparison Group:  
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Therefore, differences in the average trend in outcomes between the treatment group and 
comparison group over the period of time leading up to the BPCI initiative = (14) – (15)   
= (  
    =  
 
This coefficient of estimate should be statistically insignificant if the pre-trends assumption 
holds. This study reports the significance of  for each outcome. Third, composition of the 
treatment and comparison groups was examined through observed covariates between them 
before and after the intervention.  
 
General operationalized conceptual framework of agency theory. 
 A goal of the BPCI initiative is to align stakeholders’ incentives by shifting the volume of 
services towards a more coordinated and value-based care. According to agency theory, a 
hospital (agent) is more likely to behave in the interest of the principal (CMS) in the context of a 
BPCI initiative (outcome-based contract) that sets a target price for each episode of care. Further, 
a hospital is more likely to behave under value-based care since CMS has the information to 
measure hospital performance. To evaluate potential changes in how a hospital’s behavior 
responds to the BPCI initiative, my study measured changes in the effectiveness and efficiency 
of hospital performance by analyzing the following variables in patient level: home, mortality, 
complications, LOS, total charge, and average charge (Figure 11).   
Agency theory leads to six key predictions that can be tested with an empirical model 
(Figure 11). First, patients of BPCI-participating hospitals are more likely to be discharged to 
home than patients of non-participating hospitals. Second, patients at BPCI-participating 
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hospitals are more likely to have lower in-hospital mortality than patients at non-participating 
hospitals. Third, patients at BPCI-participating hospitals are less likely to have complications 
than patients at non-participating hospitals. Fourth, patients at BPCI-participating hospitals are 
more likely to have a shorter LOS than patients at non-participating hospitals. Fifth, patients at 
BPCI-participating hospitals are more likely to have lower total charges/costs than patients at 
non-participating hospitals. Fifth, patients at BPCI-participating hospitals are more likely to have 
lower total charges/costs than patients at non-participating hospitals. And finally, patients at 
BPCI-participating hospitals are more likely to have lower average charges than patients at non-
participating hospitals. 
 
Difference-in-differences analyses for discrete variables. 
To evaluate the behavior or performance of the agent with an outcome-based contract 
from the principal, as shown in Figures 6 and 7, the conceptual framework was operationalized 
and displayed in Figure 9. When an evaluation of the agent’s behavior focused on effectiveness, 
measured by three dichotomous variables, the DiD model on discrete dependent variables was 
performed to test the hypotheses of this investigation. According to Figure 10 and Equation (2), 
the general empirical DiD regression model, each of the indicators had its own equation as listed 
below. The detailed relationships among variables are displayed in Figure 12.    
 
Agent (Effectiveness) = f (Contract with Principal, Control Variables) 
Hospital (Discharge Location) = f1 (BPCI, Control Variables) 
Hospital (In-hospital Mortality) = f2 (BPCI, Control Variables) 
Hospital (Complication) = f3 (BPCI, Control Variables) 
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Accordingly, the operationalized hypotheses are as follows: 
• H1a1a. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more 
likely to be discharged to home than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H1a1b.  Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more 
likely to be discharged to HHS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H1a1c. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative-participating hospitals were less likely 
to be discharged to SNF than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H1a2. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely 
to die in hospital than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H1a3. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely 
to have complications than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H1b1a. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely 
to be discharged to home than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H1b1b. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more 
likely to be discharged to HHS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H1b1c. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely 
to be discharged to SNF than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H1b2. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely to 
die in hospital than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H1b3. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely to 
have complications than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
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The DiD analysis on discrete variables was conducted using general regression, OLS, in 
STATA, version 15.1. 
 
Difference-in-differences analyses for continuous variables. 
When the evaluation of the agent’s behavior focused on efficiency, as measured by two 
continuous variables, the DiD model on continuous dependent variables was performed to test 
the hypotheses of this investigation. According to Figure 12 and Equation (2), the general 
empirical DiD regression model, each of the indicators had its own equation, as listed below. The 
detailed relationships among variables were displayed in Figure 9. 
 
Agent (Efficiency) = f (Contract with Principal, Control Variables) 
Hospital (LOS) = f4 (BPCI, covariates) 
Hospital (Total Charge/Cost) = f5 (BPCI, covariates) 
Hospital (Average Charge) = f6  (BPCI, covariates) 
 
Accordingly, the operationalized hypotheses are as follows; on average, 
• H2a4. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely 
to have shorter LOS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H2a5. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely 
to have lower total charges than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H2a6. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely 
to have lower average charges than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
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• H2b4. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely 
to have shorter LOS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
• H2b5. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely 
to have lower total charges than their counterparts in non-participating hospital. 
• H2b6. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely 
to have lower average charges than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
The DiD analysis on continuous variables was conducted using general regression, OLS, 
in STATA, version 15.1. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter detailed the study design, data sources, variable measurements, and 
analytical approaches used in this investigation. The SIDN is a relatively rich database for 
studying patient care outcomes and hospital performance and includes all community hospitals in 
Nevada. The SIDN data were logically cleaned and able to be used for secondary analysis. 
MJRL and sepsis were good representatives of clinical procedures and conditions for studying 
the potential effects of bundled payment. The DiD modeling was applied to test the study 






Characteristics of the Study Population 
 During the 2013–2017 study period, a total of 4,470 patients underwent MJRL at the 
eight hospitals that participated in the BPCI initiative for the MJRL episode of care (Figure 9).  
These participating hospitals (treatment) were compared with nine non-participating hospitals 
(comparison) that treated 4,400 MJRL patients (Table 2). For sepsis, a total of 4,087 patients 
were treated at the four hospitals that participated in the BPCI initiative for sepsis episode of care 
(Figure 9). These participating hospitals were compared with 13 comparison hospitals that 
treated 13,269 patients for sepsis during the study period. The characteristics of MJRL and sepsis 
for the treatment and comparison groups, both before and after implementation of the BPCI 
initiative, are shown in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.   
 
Patient characteristics. 
The characteristics of patients at BPCI initiative participating hospitals were similar to 
the characteristics of patients seen at comparison hospitals for MJRL procedures (Table 6). A 
large proportion of patients in the treatment and comparison groups were between ages 65–74 
(55% and 45%, respectively) followed by the 75–84-year-old groups (28% and 31%, 
respectively) (Table 5). Both treatment and comparison groups had a higher proportion of female 
(61.6% vs 61.0%, respectively) and white patients (84.3% vs 80.9%, respectively). The 
proportion of patients with individual comorbidities at the BPCI initiative participating and 
comparison hospitals were similar. Both BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals had 
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a higher proportion of hypertensive (66.6% vs 61.9%, respectively) and diabetic patients (18.4% 
vs 17.8%, respectively).   
For sepsis, patients’ characteristics at treatment and comparison hospitals were also 
similar. A large proportion of patients in treatment and comparison hospitals were between65–74 
years old (34.5% vs 33.9%, respectively) and 75–84 years old (29.9% vs 29.3%, respectively). 
The BPCI initiative participating hospitals and comparison hospitals had about the same portion 
of male and female patients (53.1% of males in treatment vs 49.8% of females in comparison, 
respectively), and both groups had a higher proportion of white patients (66.8% for treatment vs 
72.6% for comparison). In terms of individual comorbidities, comparison hospitals had a higher 
proportion of patients with hypertension (35.9% vs 42.3%) and COPD (28.8% vs 30.9%), 
respectively, than BPCI initiative participating hospitals.   
 Characteristics of patients in the pre- and post-BPCI initiative were similar for both 
treatment and comparison groups for MJRL procedures and sepsis, except for the proportion of 
patients with individual comorbidities for sepsis. Both treatment and comparison hospitals had a 
higher proportion of diabetes with complications (25.2% vs 19.3%, respectively) and congestive 
heart failure patients (24.3% vs 20.6%, respectively) after the BPCI initiative compared to before 
the BPCI initiative period. 
 
Hospital characteristics. 
 Since the BPCI initiative is a voluntary participation program, comparing hospital 
characteristics between BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals is important. Both the 
BPCI initiative participating and non-participating hospitals for MJRL were more likely to be 
medium-size hospitals (89.4% of the treatment and 63.8% of the comparison hospitals with 100–
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300 beds). Compared with the comparison hospitals, those participating in the BPCI initiative for 
MJRL were more likely to be non-profit (55.5% of the treatment vs 23.9% of the comparison) 
and non-teaching hospitals (0.0% of the treatment vs 5.9% of the comparison). Results were 
similar for sepsis, except both the BPCI initiative participating and non-participating hospitals 
were more likely to be profit hospitals (64.6% vs 67.0%, respectively). 
The composition of hospital characteristics of treatment and comparison groups did not 
change over the course of the study for MJRL, except for changes of the BPCI initiative 
participating hospitals in hospital ownership. After the BPCI initiative, more profit hospitals 
among the BPCI initiative participating hospitals operated MJRL procedures compared to before 
the-BPCI initiative period (44.6% of treatment during pre-BPCI and 78.7% of treatment during 
post-BPCI). Results were similar for sepsis in that those hospital characteristics for the treatment 
and comparison groups did not alter before or after the BPCI initiative.  
 
Means and standard deviations for dependent variables.  
 Tables 8 and 9 describe the means and standard deviations for dependent variables in 
treatment and comparison hospitals, pre- and post-BPCI initiative for MJRL and sepsis.   
 
Pre-Trend Tests 
 Significances of outcomes from pre-trend tests for each dependent variable indicated the 
validity of DiD analyses used in this study (Table 10). For MJRL, differences in the average 
trend in outcomes of all dependent variables in the treatment group and comparison group over 
the period of time (-24 to 24 months) leading up to the BPCI initiative were not statistically 
significant at 10% except home discharge at 5%. Results were the same for sepsis from 33 
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months before to 29 months after the BPCI initiative at 10% significance. Therefore, my study 
used two different time periods to examine effects of the BPCI initiative on hospital performance 
for MJRL and sepsis. For MJRL, 24 months before and after the BPCI initiative on October 1, 
2015 were examined. For sepsis, 33 months before and 30 months after the BPCI initiative on 
July 1, 2015 were examined. 
 
Effectiveness of Hospital Behaviors and Performance 
 
Discharge location. 
Some changes were observed in discharging patients to home for sepsis at the BPCI 
initiative participating hospitals compared to the comparison hospitals during the post-BPCI 
versus pre-BPCI periods. DiD estimates of 0.042 (significant at 5%) indicated that patients in the 
treatment group for sepsis experienced an additional 0.042 increase on average in the probability 
of being discharged to home following the BPCI initiative, as compared to the patients in the 
comparison group (Table 11). The average probability of home discharge in the treatment group 
during the pre- period was 0.169 (Table 9) and the pre-policy probability was estimated to 
increase by 0.042. Therefore, effects of the BPCI initiative led to an estimated 25% (i.e., 
0.042/0.169=0.249) increase in the probability of a home discharge for sepsis. More specifically, 
patients younger than 64 years of age (0.06; 35.5% average increase) and patients with 
hypertension (0.047; 27.8% average increase) were associated with a statistically significant 
increase in home discharge (Table 11). Hispanic (coef. =0.074, P<.01) and Asian patients (coef. 
=0.037, P<.05) were significantly associated with an increase in home discharge for sepsis. 
However, my study did not find this level of home discharge for MJRL (p-value from pre-trend 
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test = 0.059) (Table 10).  
In short, the results of my study supported the hypothesis that patients with sepsis in the 
BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely to be discharged to home than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H1b1a).  However, the study did not support the 
assumption that patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more 
likely to be discharged to home than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H1a1a).   
 
In-hospital mortality. 
There were no apparent differences in hospital deaths related to MJRL between patients 
treated in BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals before and after the BPCI initiative 
(Table 12). However, results were different for sepsis with a DID estimate of -0.053 (significant 
at 1%). In the treatment group during the pre- period, the probability of in-hospital mortality was 
0.248 (Table 8) and pre-policy probability was estimated to be reduced by -0.053 to 0.195 (i.e., 
0.248 – 0.053 = 0.195), which implied that the average mortality rate for patients treated at 
BPCI-participating hospitals decreased by about 21.4% following the BPCI initiative relative to 
the patients treated at non-participating hospitals. (i.e., (0.195 – 0.248)/0.248 = - 0.214 or simply 
(-0.053 /0 .248 = - 0.214). Patients younger than 64 years old (-0.051 with a significance of 1%) 
and with comorbidities (specifically diabetes with complications, hypertension, depression, and 
obesity) were highly associated with a decrease in hospital death for sepsis.   
 
Complications. 
 A decrease in occurrence of complications among patients with sepsis was observed 
between the BPCI initiative participating hospitals and the non-participating hospitals. My study 
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observed an average 0.036 decrease (5% significance) in the probability of pressure ulcers 
among patients treated for sepsis at the BPCI-participating hospitals relative to patients treated at 
non-participating hospitals for the same condition (Table 13). The average probability of 
pressure ulcers in the treatment group in the pre- period was 0.173 (Table 9). Therefore, the BPI 
initiative reflected a 20.8% (i.e., -0.036/0.173) decrease in the incidence of pressure ulcers 
among patients treated for sepsis in the treatment group compared with the comparison group. 
However, the results were different for MJRL in that no significant changes in complications 
were observed. My results showed no significant changes in the incidence of pressure ulcers, 
hospital falls, or postoperative sepsis among patients treated for sepsis at BPCI-participating 
hospitals compared to patients in the comparison hospitals (Table 13). 
 
Efficiency of Hospital Behaviors and Performance 
 
Length of hospital stay. 
 Changes in LOS with the episode of care for sepsis were detected with DiD estimates of -
0.5 (significant at 5%), which indicated that patients in the treatment group experienced an 
average 0.5-day decrease in LOS following the BPCI initiative compared to their counterparts in 
the comparison group (Table 14). Average LOS before the policy for the treatment group was 
almost 8 days (7.91 days, on average) (Table 9) and the pre-BPCI initiative probability was 
estimated to be reduced by -0.5, or just over 7 days (e.g., 7.91 - 0.5 = 7.41), representing an 
estimated 6.75% reduction in LOS (e.g., (7.41–7.91)/7.91 = - 0.0675). Therefore, the BPCI 
initiative led to a half-day decrease (6.8%) in LOS among patients treated for sepsis at BPCI-
participating hospitals compared to patients treated at non-participating hospitals. This study 
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found no statistically significant results for sepsis among patients older than 85 years or patients 
with diabetes, diabetes with complications, hypertension, congestive heart failures, COPD, or 
obesity. The BPCI initiative led to a decrease in LOS of almost a full day (coef. = -0.708, P<0.01) 
for patients older than 85 years. A decreased LOS was also present among patients with diabetes 
by 4.4% (coef = -0.346, P<0.01) and hypertension by 9.6% (coef = -0.762, P<0.01). However, 
patients with DWC, CHF, COPD, and obesity showed a probability for an increase in LOS by a 
half-day.  
 The results, however, were different for MJRL. My study observed no significant 
changes in LOS among patients who had MJRL procedures at BPCI-participating hospitals 
relative to patients at comparison hospitals for the same procedure. 
 
Total charge per hospital discharge.  
The effects of the BPCI initiative on total charges were detected for sepsis but not for 
MJRL. My study showed a $13,092.85 decrease (significant at 5%) in total charges, on average, 
among patients treated for sepsis by the treatment group compared to the comparison group after 
the BPCI implementation (Table 15). The average total charges in the treatment group in the pre- 
period was $142,782 (Table 9) and the pre-policy total charge was estimated to be reduced by 
$13,092.85, to $129,690. Therefore, the BPCI initiative led to a $13,092.85, or 9.2% decrease in 
total charges, on average, at the BPCI initiative participating hospitals relative to non-
participating hospitals following the BPCI initiative.  Effects of the BPCI initiative on a decrease 
in total charges for sepsis were significantly associated with patient characteristics. First, this 
study indicated a significant decrease in total charges for ages 75—84, and older than 85. There 
was an average decrease of $8,351 (significant at 1%) and $23,114 (significant at 1%) in total 
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charges among patients 75—84, and older than 85, respectively. Second, patients in the 
treatment group with diabetes and hypertension were significantly associated with an average 
total charge reduction of 3.1% ($4,465 decrease, 5% significance) and 13% ($18,618 decrease, 1% 
significance), respectively.   
My study showed no significant changes in total charge, on average, for patients with 
MJRL procedures at BPCI-participating hospitals compared with patients treated at non-
participating hospitals.   
 
Average charge per hospital day. 
There were no statistically significant changes in average charges per hospital day among 
patients treated for MJRL at the BPCI initiative participating hospitals compared with patients 
treated at non-participating hospitals, in the pre- versus post-BPCI initiative periods (Table 16).  
The results were the same for patients with sepsis. 
 
Answers to Research Questions 
The first research question asked was if the BPCI initiative would show positive effects 
on the effectiveness of hospital performance for MJRL and sepsis. My study found that that the 
BPCI initiative positively affected the effectiveness of hospital performance for sepsis but not for 
MJRL. The likelihood of patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals being 
discharged to home increased more than that of their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
Similar findings were found in regard to in-hospital mortality; the level of mortality was lower 
among patients in the BPCI-participating hospitals than those in non-participating hospitals after 
the BPCI implementation. Regarding complications, patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative 
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participating hospitals were less likely to have pressure ulcers than patients in non-participating 
hospitals. The results, however, were different for MJRL. Patients with MJRL procedures 
showed no significant changes in mortality or complications at BPCI-participating hospitals 
compared to non-participating hospitals.   
 The second research question asked was if the BPCI initiative would show positive 
effects on the efficiency of hospital performance for MJRL and sepsis. This study revealed some 
positive effects of the BPCI initiative on improving the efficiency of hospital performance for 
sepsis but not for MJRL. Regarding sepsis, patients in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals 
tended to have shorter LOS and lower total charges than their counterparts in non-participating 
hospitals. In contrast, the BPCI initiative did not affect the efficiency of hospital performance in 
the case of MJRL. 
 
Summary 
 Results of the data analyses using the SIDN showed that the BPCI initiative was 
associated with improving the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance for sepsis but 
not for MJRL. My study showed an average 25% increase in the probability of a home discharge, 
an average 21.4% decrease in likelihood of mortality, an average 12% decrease in likelihood of 
complications, an average 6.8% decrease in LOS, and an average 9.2% reduction in total charge 
for sepsis patients treated at the BPCI-participating hospitals compared to patients treated at non-
participating hospitals due to the BPCI initiative (Table 17). The two research questions and five 
of the six hypotheses tested for hospital performance on sepsis demonstrated marked changes, 
supporting the BPCI initiative participating hospitals as more likely to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of medical care than non-participating hospitals (Table 18). However, none of the 
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six hypotheses tested for hospital performance on MJRL were significant in supporting that 
BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of surgical care than non-participating hospitals. I found no differences in changes in 
home discharge, mortality, complications, LOS, or total charges for MJRL patients at BPCI-
participating hospitals and non-participating hospitals. The results of this study were validated by 
a pre-trend test (Table 10). A further discussion of the findings, comparison with other BPCI-
related studies, and directions for future research, policy implication, and the limitations of this 







The high cost of healthcare in the United States presents one of its most formidable 
challenges. A large body of research on reducing healthcare expenditure suggests a strong 
relationship between the behavior of health care providers and reimbursement models. The 
objective of this study was to examine the association between health care outcomes and a value-
based financial incentive reimbursement model, the BPCI initiative from CMS, regarding the 
effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance. This study makes several contributions to 
the literature. To our knowledge, this is the first study that addresses effects of the BPCI 
initiative on hospital performance based on a relatively long pre- and post-intervention period 
and relying on the most recently available data. Little is known about the potential effects of the 
BPCI initiative on medical care. This study adds new empirical evidence to the existing literature 
by examining the association between the BPCI initiative and outcomes of sepsis, which focused 
on non-surgical medical care. Further, our study, for the first time, expands the measurement of 
outcomes to clinical complications among the AHRQ’s Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) by 
studying the bundled payment policy; we examined pressure ulcers, patient falls, and 
postoperative sepsis.  Next, this study adds to our knowledge of the bundled payment through the 
BPCI initiative. It showed there were no significant changes between intervention and 
comparison hospitals during the pre-intervention period (McCoy et al., 2017). An earlier report 
on the BPCI initiative did not explicitly confirm this parallel in pre-intervention trends—a major 
assumption of DiD analysis (Dimick & Ryan, 2014; Dummit et al., 2018). Finally, this study 
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compared the effects of bundle payments on hospital performance between surgical and medical 
care. The following sections discuss key findings, directions for future research, public policy 




Effectiveness of hospital care under the BPCI initiative.  
 Findings from this study indicated that the BPCI initiative was associated with improving 
the effectiveness of hospital performance for medical care, specifically non-surgical medical care 
for sepsis, but not for surgical care for MJRL. 
 
Discharge location. 
Earlier studies on the BPCI initiative reported a shift of discharging location from SNFs 
to home following MJRL procedures. Froemke et al. (2015) showed an increase in discharging 
patients to SNFs from 10.5 to 18.3%, while home discharge increased from 54 to 63.7% 
(Froemke et al., 2015). Iorio and et al. (2016) studied CMS claim data from one academic 
hospital and found increased discharges to home following implementation of the BPCI initiative 
(Iorio et al., 2016). Doran and Zabinski (2015) examined effects of the BPCI initiative on 
Medicare and non-Medicare patients at a community hospital, and reported an increase in home 
discharge among Medicare patients (Doran & Zabinski, 2015). Unlike earlier studies, however, 
my study did not find positive changes in outcomes for home discharge. This may have been due 
to implementation of another CMS outcome-based contract prior to the BPCI initiative. The 
CMS announced the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) for three medical 
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conditions (myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia) in 2010 and it was expanded to 
include a surgical condition, MJRL in 2013  (Chhabra, Ibrahim, Thumma, Ryan, & Dimick, 
2019).  My study did not measure hospital readmissions due to limited data availability. 
However, preventing hospital readmission was being enforced by HRRP in 2013, which was the 
same year as the voluntary participation in the BPCI initiative began, and this may have 
influenced the discharge of patients to home for MJRL. Ali et al. (2017) reported that the 
comorbidities of individual patients were significantly associated with 30-day readmission after a 
THA procedure (Ali, Loeffler, Aylin, & Bottle, 2017).  Yao et al. (2017) identified risk factors of 
unplanned readmission among patients discharged to home after MJRL. They found older 
patients and patients with diabetes, chronic heart failure, hypertension, or pulmonary disease 
were strong predictors for hospital readmission following the home discharge of MJRL patients. 
My study showed patients older than 85 years (coef = -0.130, P<0.01) and with comorbidities at 
BPCI-participating hospitals were associated with a reduction in patients discharged to home. 
Note that readmission is included in Model 2 of the BPCI initiative. Therefore, I speculate that 
BPCI-participating hospitals may have responded differently to the BPCI initiative in addition to 
the earlier HRRP contract. Regardless of BPCI participation, both participating and non-
participating hospitals may have changed their practices in response to HRRP. However, BPCI-
participating hospitals would have a double incentive to reduce readmission in response to 
another contract—the BPCI initiative. Therefore, BPCI-participating hospitals were less likely to 
discharge high-risk patients to home in response to the BPCI initiative and HRRP, particularly 
for elderly patients and patients with comorbidities, thus preventing hospital readmission.   
 My study demonstrated that patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating hospitals 
were more likely to be discharged to home than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals 
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after the BPCI implementation. These results differed from some existing studies. Two empirical 
studies on sepsis reported no  effects of the BPCI initiative on discharges to home (CMS Bundled 
Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual 
Report, 2018; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018).  However, one non-peer-reviewed report showed an 
increase in home discharge after implementing a clinical pathway for sepsis treatment. This 
report was supported by other studies on the implementation of sepsis care bundles and an 
increase in discharging patients to home (Han et al., 2018). Sepsis care bundles are “a group of 
best evidence based interventions which when instituted together, gives maximum outcome 
benefits” (Khan & Divatia, 2010). To implement sepsis care bundles, engagement of all 
stakeholders in the care of sepsis (e.g., physicians, nurses, laboratory operations, pharmacists) 
and development of management strategies to ensure compliance, is necessary. Therefore, BPCI-
participating hospitals are more likely to improve their internal structure of care delivery to 
increase home discharge in response to the BPCI initiative.   
  
In-hospital mortality. 
My study did not detect differences in changes in hospital mortality for MJRL between 
the BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals before and after the BPCI initiative. This 
was consistent with findings from other studies that used Medicare claims to examine the 90-day 
post-procedure mortality (CMS, 2018b; Dummit et al., 2016). My result also fits the temporal 
trend of in-hospital mortality. There has been a trend of declining in-hospital mortality after 
MJRL procedure over the last few decades. Studies have identified that the decreasing trend of 
MJRL mortality is associated with initiation of multi-disciplinary pre-operative assessment, as 
well as improved surgical safety and post-operative care (Berstock, Beswick, Lenguerrand, 
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Whitehouse, & Blom, 2014; Hunt et al., 2013). Therefore, the findings of my study do not 
support the hypothesis that patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals are 
less likely to die in hospital than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H1a2).  
In contrast, the findings of my study supported that patients with sepsis in the BPCI 
initiative participating hospitals were less likely to die in the hospital than their counterparts in 
non-participating hospitals (H1b2). This finding differs from other existing studies that, based on 
Medicare claims, reported no difference in changes in mortality of sepsis between BPCI-
participating hospitals and non-participating hospitals (CMS, 2018b; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018).  
Earlier diagnosis and immediate treatment are imperative actions to reduce hospital death for 
patients with sepsis. To enforce early diagnosis and rapid initiation of treatment for sepsis, CMS 
implemented a new sepsis core measure, SEP-1, in 2015 and CMS now recommends sepsis 
bundle compliance with an ongoing increase in mortality and costs of sepsis (Medicare, 2018). 
Another study found a significant decrease in in-hospital mortality after implementation of the 
SEP-1 measure (Ramsdell, Smith, & Kerkhove, 2017). I have no direct information about 
whether or not BPCI-participating hospitals have implemented CMS sepsis bundle compliance. 
From the findings of my study, however, I assume that BPCI-participating hospitals were more 
likely to implement the scientifically proven CMS sepsis bundle compliance responding to BPCI 
initiative than the non-participating hospitals.  
 
Complications. 
To the best of my knowledge, no study has examined the potential effects of the BPCI 
initiative on changes in complications. Most existing studies focus on LOS and total cost 
(Nichols & Vose, 2016; Regenbogen et al., 2017). My study, in the case of MJRL, did not detect 
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differences in changes in the incidence of pressure ulcers, patient falls with hip fracture, or 
postoperative sepsis between BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals. There is a 
possible explanation. In 2008, CMS started a No-Pay policy on hospital-acquired conditions that 
included hospital falls, pressure ulcers, and surgical-site infections. Fehlberg et al. (2017) 
showed nurses were about twice as likely to perform fall-related interventions after the CMS No-
Pay policy (Fehlberg et al., 2017). On the other hand, rates of hospital-acquired pressure ulcers 
remained unchanged following initiation of the No-Pay policy in 2008 (Meddings et al., 2015). 
The CMS No-Pay policy on hospital-acquired conditions in 2008 may have already improved 
these conditions at both BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals before the BPCI 
initiative started in 2015. In the context of agency theory, hospitals (agents) have already 
improved their performance by decreasing hospital falls, pressure ulcers, and surgical-site 
infections in response to other outcome-based contracts (e.g., No-Pay policy on hospital-acquired 
conditions in 2008) before the BPCI initiative started in 2015. As a result, the BPCI initiative 
could not further change the performance of BPCI-participating hospitals to reduce 
complications compared to non-participating hospitals. Therefore, my findings do not support 
the hypothesis that patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less 
likely to have complications than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H1a3).  
Conversely, my study showed a greater decrease in incidents of pressure ulcers for 
patients with sepsis in BPCI-participating hospitals compared to those in non-participating 
hospitals. To my knowledge, this is the first study that detects a positive association between the 
BPCI initiative and complications from sepsis. The presence of pressure ulcers is associated with 
an increase in discharging patients to SNFs, mortality, LOS to 7 days, and costs (Bauer, Rock, 
Nazzal, Jones, & Qu, 2016). Therefore, the agent (hospital) is more likely to develop a 
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coordinated organizational structure to decrease the incidence of pressure ulcers and align with 
the interest of the principal (CMS). This alignment is an effort to contain costs and improve the 
overall quality of care in response to outcome-based contracts (the BPCI initiative), bundled 
payments.   
 
Efficiency of hospital care under the BPCI initiative.  
Results of my study demonstrated that the BPCI initiative was associated with enhancing 
hospital efficiency for medical care of sepsis, but did not enhance the effectiveness of surgical 
care for MJRL.   
 
Length of in-hospital stay. 
There were no substantial differences in changes in LOS for MJRL between participating 
and non-participating hospitals after BPCI implementation. These results were inconsistent with 
findings from the BPCI initiative literature, which found a significant decrease in LOS. A recent 
analysis of the National Inpatient Sample data showed a LOS reduction from 4.06 days in 2002 
to 2.97 days in 2013 (Molloy et al., 2017). Another study showed an 18% reduction in average 
LOS after standardizing a care pathway for MJRL in response to the BPCI initiative (Froemke et 
al., 2015). This reduction was mainly due to improvements in pain management protocols, 
implants, anesthesia procedures, and surgical techniques. Findings of my study may be explained 
by proactive behaviors at non-participating hospitals. According to Chhabra (2019), “Proactive 
behavior is a behavior of taking initiative in improving current circumstances rather than 
passively adapting to present conditions” (Chhabra et al., 2019). MJRL is the most common 
elective surgery in the U.S. and a best-fit episode of care for a bundled payment model; CMS’ 
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alternative payment model has mainly focused on MJRL. The ACE demonstration program in 
2009, BPCI initiative in 2012, and Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model (CJR) in 
2016 are different bundled payment models that CMS established in a process of developing the 
most effective reimbursement model. Further, private insurance might be proactive and design its 
reimbursement model based on the CMS bundle payments since the MJRL episode of care is at 
the forefront of a value-based payment model. Therefore, hospitals that do not participate in the 
BPCI initiative may still want to prepare for the bundled payment model because private payers 
typically add new methodologies to their provider contracts. BPCI non-participating hospitals 
might have proactively redesigned the care pathway for MJRL as BPCI-participating hospitals 
have done. As a result, regardless of the BPCI initiative participation, all hospitals are more 
likely to improve LOS for MJRL. The results of my study did not support the hypothesis that 
patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely to have 
shorter LOS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H2a4). 
Regarding sepsis, LOS at BPCI-participating hospitals decreased compared to non-
participating hospitals. My study supported the hypothesis that patients with sepsis in BPCI 
initiative participating hospitals were more likely to have a shorter LOS than their counterparts in 
non-participating hospitals (H2b4). There are several explanations for this finding. First, a 
significant decrease in complications at the BPCI-participating hospitals in my study might have 
contributed to a significant reduction in LOS. Second, the literature on sepsis shows that it is 
possible to decrease LOS using evidence-based guidelines. For example, implementation of a 
machine learning-based sepsis prediction algorithm decreased LOS by 9.55% and mortality by 
60.24% and the same results were repeated with the SEP-1 measure (McCoy & Das, 2017; 
Ramsdell et al., 2017). Therefore, the findings of my study may indicate that BPCI-participating 
 85 
hospital were more likely to implement evidence-based guidelines in response to the BPCI 
initiative.  
 In the context of agency theory, the agent (hospital) is more likely to implement a 
behavior that decreases LOS for sepsis to align with the goal of the principal (CMS), and to 
control cost of care in response to an outcome-based contract (the BPCI initiative). Non-
participating hospitals may have behaved differently, however, since they have no incentives to 
decrease LOS. In fact, without effective contracts that could govern the relationship between 
principal and agent, an agent (non-participating hospital) is more likely to increase LOS to 
receive more payments. Therefore, conflicts of interest still exist between the principal (CMS) 
and agent (hospitals) without an outcome-based contract, such as the BPCI initiative.  
 
Total charge per hospital discharge. 
 The results of my study did not support that patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative 
participating hospitals were more likely to have lower total charges than their counterparts in 
non-participating hospitals (H2a5). Unlike my findings, earlier studies on the BPCI initiative 
show significant reductions in total costs and Medicare payments for MJRL (CMS Bundled 
Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual 
Report, 2018; Froemke et al., 2015). The common focus of hospitals seeking to contain costs is a 
reduction in LOS. With insignificant changes in LOS and complications at BPCI-participating 
hospitals for MJRL, it is not surprising to see insignificant changes in total charge.  
My study supported the hypothesis that patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative 
participating hospitals were likely to have lower total charges than their counterparts in non-
participating hospitals (H2b5). To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study to show effects 
 86 
of bundled payments on the efficiency of hospital care regarding sepsis. First, in this study a 
significant reduction in total charge for sepsis was expected with significant reductions in LOS 
and complications. Second, as mentioned earlier, adherence to sepsis bundled care is important 
in decreasing sepsis-related costs. Therefore, my findings may indicate that the agent (hospital) 
will more likely act to decrease total charges and align with the goal of the principal (CMS); they 
will try to restrain the cost of care in response to the outcome-based contract (the BPCI initiative), 
which passes financial risk to the hospital via gainsharing and penalties. Conversely, non-
participating hospitals without an outcome-based contract may behave differently. These agents 
(hospitals), according to the agency theory, are more likely to perform more treatments to receive 
more payments. Since the principal (CMS) has asymmetrical information about the agent’s work, 
the agent has more incentive to provide more treatments. Therefore, the agent may tend to 
increase total charges in opposition to the interest of the principal, which encourages value-based 
care. 
 
Average charge per hospital day. 
 This study found no significant changes in average charges per hospital day for MJRL or 
sepsis at BPCI initiative participating hospitals relative to non-participating hospitals. Even 
though findings of this study did not support that patients with MJRL and sepsis in the BPCI 
initiative participating hospitals were more likely to have lower average daily charges than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H2a6, H2b6), the study provided a different 
perspective on hospital performance under the BPCI initiative, especially for sepsis. As expected, 
there were no changes in average daily charges for MJRL as there were no changes in LOS and 
total charge between the treatment and comparison groups for this study, following the BPCI 
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initiative (Table 17). For sepsis, however, I expected a decrease in average daily charges with the 
reduction in LOS and total charge. No changes in average daily charges reflect that the intensity 
of care has not changed. I suspect the reduced total charge might be due to mainly in a decrease 
in LOS, but not by altering the concentration of care per patient’s stay. This explains how agents 
(BPCI-participating hospitals) are more likely to perform value-based care in responding to the 
contract (BPCI initiative) by decreasing total charge by reducing LOS while the intensity of care 
remains the same. 
 
Hospital Care under the BPCI Initiative based on Agency Theory 
 Figure 13 illustrates changes in hospital behavior in responding to the BPCI initiative for 
MJRL and sepsis. My study indicated that hospitals performed differently in response to the 
outcome-based contract, the BPCI initiative, for surgical and medical care. For sepsis, BPCI-
participating hospitals are more likely to improve their organizational structure, incorporating 
evidence-based guidelines such as sepsis care bundles, in response to the BPCI initiative. By 
increasing routine home discharges and decreasing the negative outcomes of in-hospital 
mortality and complications, the incentives of BPCI-participating hospitals (agent) regarding 
sepsis seemed to shift toward value-based care. Conversely, non-participating hospitals may 
have behaved differently because they had no incentives to invest in improving organizational 
structure. Therefore, the results of my study supported that an agent in an outcome-based 
contract with a principal is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal by improving its 
effectiveness in the medical care of sepsis.  
 The BPCI initiative also has effects on governing relationships between principal and 
agent in terms of its efficiency in sepsis care. My study showed an agent was more capable of  
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restrain total charges and reducing length of hospital stay under an outcome-based contract since 
the agent had stronger incentives to do so  under the outcome-based contract (the BPCI 
initiative); the financial risk was passed on to the hospital through gainsharing and penalties. 
Conversely, non-participating hospitals may feel less compelled to increase their efficiency 
without an outcome-based contract. Therefore, the conflicting goals between principal (CMS) 
and agent in non-participating hospitals still exist. 
 For MJRL, my study found no improvement in efficiency for participating hospitals 
versus non-participating hospitals in responding to the BPCI initiative. This could be interpreted 
in two ways. First, both participating and non-participating hospitals may have increased the 
efficiency of their performance regardless of the BPCI initiative. Second, neither participating 
nor non-participating hospitals were able to improve their efficiency, even under the BPCI 
initiative. MJRL is an elective procedure with large variations in cost of care and a relatively 
simple clinical pathway. For example, the cost of surgical implants has a wide price range 
depending on a physician’s choice. Earlier studies on the BPCI initiative have shown that a 
reduction in implant cost is one of the first objectives in lowering total charges for MJRL (Doran 
& Zabinski, 2015; Navathe et al., 2017). Studies also have shown that physician-led 
standardization of care reduced the cost of implants, prescriptions, and laboratories (Froemke et 
al., 2015; Siddiqi et al., 2017). Since hospitals and physicians are both financially accountable 
for inpatient care, it seems that participating hospitals would be more likely to focus on physician 
engagement to coordinate and standardize a clinical pathway for MJRL. Nevertheless, my study 
did not produce the anticipated findings. Therefore, I speculate that both participating and non-
participating hospitals have improved their efficiency of care. There are three major healthcare 
systems in Nevada. All three systems that include 10 hospitals participated in Phase 1 
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(preparation stage) Model 2 of the BPCI initiative for MJRL care. While transitioning to Phase 2, 
one hospital system terminated their participation, leaving seven participating hospitals moving 
into Phase 2 of the BPCI initiative. Further, there are a limited number of orthopedic physicians 
in Nevada and they often work in different healthcare systems. Considering all aspects of these 
unique healthcare delivery systems and infrastructures in Nevada, I speculate that non-
participating hospitals are also able to engage with physicians to streamline health care pathways 
and improve outcomes. 
 My study did not support agency theory on the effectiveness of hospital care for MJRL 
under the BPCI initiative since no significant differences in changes in home discharge, mortality, 
or complications were evident between participating and non-participating hospitals. However, 
agency theory explains the agents’ (both participating and non-participating hospitals) behavior 
in responding to another outcome-based contract (CMS No-Pay policy on hospital-acquired 
condition) in 2008. Therefore, a conflict of interest between CMS and its agents may have 
started to resolve before the BPCI initiative was implemented in Nevada in 2015. 
 
Summary of the Findings  
 Based on the agency theory, I examined the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital 
performance for MJRL and care of sepsis in response to the outcome-based contract, the BPCI 
initiative.   
The findings of this study did not support the hypothesis that BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals were more likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance 
for surgical care (MJRL) than non-participating hospitals in response to the BPCI initiative (H1a 
and H2a).  Conversely, this study’s findings support that BPCI initiative participating hospitals 
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were more likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their performance for medical 
care (sepsis) than non-participating hospitals responding to the BPCI-initiative (H1b and H2b). 
There are several explanations for this finding. First, baseline outcomes of the BPCI-
participating hospitals were much higher than comparison groups for sepsis. For example, mean 
total charge in the treatment group was much higher ($142,782) than mean total charge in the 
comparison group ($116,990) during the pre-BPCI initiative period for the care of sepsis (Table 
9). Since target prices for the BPCI initiative are based on a hospital’s improvement over its own 
past performance and are used to determine their gainsharing, hospitals with higher baseline 
outcomes such as higher total charge have more room to improve their hospital performance. 
This suggests there might be a potential participation bias that could have led to changes in the 
different outcomes between treatment and comparison groups, before and after the BPCI 
initiative. Second, proactive effects may explain insignificant changes in hospital performance 
for MJRL. In addition to the BPCI initiative, CMS announced the CJR model in 2015. Unlike the 
BPCI initiative, the CJR model created regional competition since the target price of the CJR 
model was based on regional claims data and participating hospitals’ own data from previous 
years (McLawhorn & Buller, 2017). Therefore, hospitals not participating in the BPCI initiative 
still want to prepare for the bundled payment model to be compatible with their own region. 
Third, findings on early bundled payments for MJRL from existing studies were highly positive. 
Many studies reported a significant decrease in cost for MJRL by reconstructing the care 
pathway. Therefore, hospitals that were not participating in the BPCI initiative may have 
participated in developing a care pathway to improve effectiveness and efficiency of care. Table 
18 summarizes the general results of my hypothesis testing.   
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Directions for Future Research 
 The evaluation of alternative payment models on hospital care improvement is not 
complete. My focus on the BPCI initiative suggested some positive effects of a financial, 
outcome-based contract on hospital performance for MJRL and care of sepsis. There is one more 
year of SIDN data to be evaluated (Phase II BPCI Model 2 ended in September 30, 2018). 
However, additional data might not enable a much more in-depth analysis of the BPCI initiative 
since there are limited baseline episode payments to reduce episode spending. Additional 
research is needed to determine types of financial incentives and health care outcomes that will 
motivate hospitals to better manage resources, coordinate care, and thus reduce total charges and 
costs. Furthermore, different episodes of care may require different types of outcome 
measurements in addition to financial incentives. For example, adherence to sepsis bundle 
compliance is an essential element in reducing mortality and the cost of care for sepsis. 
Therefore, including the SEP-1 measure should be one of the outcome measurements for sepsis 
in future bundled payments.   
A qualitative study merits inclusion in future research on bundled payments to examine 
providers’ perceptions on the BPCI initiative. According to the resource dependence theory, 
managerial and organizational decision-making become important when resources are limited, as 
with a bundled payment. For example, physician engagement and care coordination are essential 
elements for successful implementation of the BPCI initiative. Therefore, operational 
perspectives on merits and barriers of the BPCI initiative implementation will be beneficial to 
advance the designing of alternative reimbursement models. Operational perspectives from non-
participating hospitals need to be conducted as well. Sampling of the qualitative study needs to 
include chief executive officers, chief operating officers, chief financial officers, medical 
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directors, and operational directors for each episode of care. 
 Patient-level information for each procedure is needed to further understand the effects of 
bundled payments on hospital performance. First, current available data only allow researchers to 
analyze effects of the BPCI initiative on total charges and costs and on total Medicare payments 
without knowing the components of the total charges and costs. For example, total charges and 
costs include those for radiology, laboratory services, ED and ICU use, cardio, respiratory 
system, blood utilization, pharmacy, operating room, and more. Further, different episodes may 
have different categories of total charges and costs. Therefore, an examination of electronic 
health records needs to be conducted to understand the effects of bundled payments on a specific 
category, whether the total cost is reduced or not. This may allow hospitals and the CMS to 
develop different strategies for different episodes of care and target the cost of different 
categories. Other aspects of in-hospital complications that need to be examined include transient 
hypotension, urinary retention, and transfusion rate.  
 Since the BPCI initiative ended in September 2018, CMS has announced another bundled 
payment model called BPCI-Advanced started on October 1, 2018. BPCI-Advanced is a 
voluntary model with a few different approaches from the BPCI initiative. The BPCI-Advanced 
is a more outcome-based model than the BPCI initiative since payment of BPCI-Advanced is 
tied to performance on quality measures rather than just target price. BPCI-Advanced adopted 
seven administrative, quality-measure fact sheets for each episode of care. The quality measures 
for MJRL include: perioperative care; hospital-level, risk-standardized complication rates; 
readmission measures; and PSIs. In addition, BPCI-Advanced provides preliminary target prices 
to participating hospitals each year. Therefore, research will be needed to determine how BPCI- 
Advanced affects hospital performance with these more specific outcome-based contracts. 
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Implications for Health Care Policy and Interventions 
 Many policy makers believe in strengthening financial and other incentives to 
improve hospital performance (Peck, Usadi, Mainor, Fisher, & Colla, 2019). My findings 
supported the observation that hospitals were more likely to act in the interest of the CMS when 
their relationship was founded on an outcome-based contract with incentives (Figure 1). 
Importantly, my findings for the bundled payment with sepsis showed the feasibility of a total 
charge reduction without compromising the quality of medical care. Even though there is limited 
research supporting my findings, the positive outcomes were a strong indicator for including 
non-surgical care when developing an alternative payment model and mechanisms. CMS has 
developed different bundled payment models as alternative payment methods to align itself with 
the interests of providers as it moves away from FFS. As bundled payment models evolve, the 
effect of the BPCI initiative shows we are moving closer to value-based care. However, more 
improvements in these models are needed. So far, the CMS model has focused on the total cost 
of care. Even quality of care was indirectly monitored by total cost, since any charges for 
readmission and post-care services were all included in their bundle. However, there is a limit to 
how much cost can be reduced after approaching a “floor.” Therefore, future developments in the 
bundled payment model need to be based on more than a target price. The absence of direct 
quality measurement is another limitation of the current model. It is evident that the same quality 
measurement should not be applied to different episodes of care. For example, the quality of 
measure for sepsis may include compliance with SEP-1, which has had an important role in 
reducing mortality and readmissions. While effective for sepsis, this measure was not effective 
for MJRL. Therefore, it may be time to expand the incentives in bundled payment plans, in 
addition to the existing financial incentives based on episode-specific and evidence-based  
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outcome measurements. 
Savings in episode payments made to the Medicare program through the BPCI initiative 
were lost in reconciliation payments to the participants (CMS Bundled Payments for Care 
Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018). 
There is more room to improve savings to the CMS, however, especially for surgical care. The 
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule is the payment system CMS uses for physician reimbursement 
during inpatient stays. Accuracy of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule is important since 
payments of Medicare’s FFS, and most commercial insurers, are based on this fee schedule, 
including alternative payment models like bundled payments (Urwin et al., 2019). Physician time 
is one indicator of a physician’s work in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. This schedule 
includes preparation time for the operation, operation time, and postoperative time of the hospital 
and the physician’s office. A recent empirical study found that the Medical Physician Fee 
Schedule significantly overestimates operating times for MJRL by 18–23 %, and that of 
revisions by 48–61% (Urwin et al., 2019). The current Medicare Physician Fee Schedule is not 
responsible for other related aspects of care, such as pre-op, post-op, and quality of care. Figure 
14 illustrates that 88.36% of gainsharing distributions go to physicians. To reduce Medicare 
payments, therefore, the bundled payment system should be modified based on an updated 
Medical Physician Fee Schedule, and then enforced.  
 
Assumptions and Limitations 
This study had several limitations. First, findings may have limited generalizability since  
the study sample was limited to hospitals in Nevada. Second, effects of the BPCI initiative might 
not represent the effectiveness and efficiency of a value-based payment model accurately since 
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its implementation was voluntary. For example, the BPCI initiative participating hospitals tended 
to have higher baselines for their episode payments than non-participating hospitals. However, 
pre-trend tests and the consistency of patient characteristics between the BPCI initiative 
participating hospitals and comparison hospitals supported the validity of this study. Third, 
selection of a comparison group might have been biased. Due to limited data availability, this 
study did not select comparison hospitals using propensity scores based on hospital and market 
characteristics and baseline outcome measurements (Dimick & Ryan, 2014; Joynt Maddox et al., 
2018). However, non-significance changes (p-value larger than 0.5) for all outcome 
measurements between the treatment and comparison groups leading up to the BPCI initiative 
supported the validly of this study (Table 10). Fourth, limited data resources also affected the 
measure of quality care in this study. Post-discharge data such as hospital readmission, ED use, 
and PAC were therefore not included. However, the recent bundled payment model by CMS, 
BPCI-Advanced, supported analyses of PSI as a quality measurement. BPCI-Advanced includes 
PSI 03, pressure ulcers, and PSI 08, hospital falls, in quality-measurement sheets for MJRL and 
sepsis. Fifth, using pressure ulcers to measure complications of sepsis may raise questions about 
the validity of measurement. Sixth, the SIDN database does not contain patient-level data, such 
as smoking, that could influence outcomes of MJRL. In addition, procedural characteristics like 
blood transfusion or operative time that may have influenced outcomes were not available in the 
SIDN database. Finally, total charges were not translated into total costs. The analyses of total 
charges were important, however, since these were the amount being claimed to Medicare.   
 
Conclusions 
To date, bundled payment models have primarily focused on surgical care, such as MJRL. 
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This study provided results that suggest hospitals could achieve improved outcomes in the 
medical care of sepsis in response to the BPCI initiative. The recognition that the BPCI initiative 
was associated with improving the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance in the 
case of sepsis, provides new opportunities for developing an outcome-based reimbursement 
model that extends to other medical care episodes. The agency theory was a well-suited 
conceptual framework, describing changes in hospital performance in response to an outcome-
based contract, the BPCI initiative. In the context of agency theory, the BPCI initiative 
participating hospitals were more likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital 
performance than non-participating hospitals because of this outcome-based contract, the BPCI 
initiative. The empirical results of this study suggested that the BPCI initiative increased home 
discharge, decreased complications, LOS, and total charges for medical care of sepsis, 
specifically, but not for surgical care of MJRL.  
 The outcome-based reimbursement model was effective in improving hospital 
performance, suggesting that public policies are needed to incentivize hospitals to be more 
effective and efficient. Overall, the BPCI initiative appears to be a step towards reducing health 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. BPCI-Participating (Treatment) and Non-Participating Hospitals (Comparison) 
  
BPCI-participating Hospitals  
(Treatment) 
 
Non-participating Hospitals   
(Comparison) 
   
  BPCI Implementation Date  
MJRL 7 Hospitals 4/1/15-9/30/18 (4 hospitals) 
10/1/15-9/30/2015 (3 hospitals) 
10 Hospitals 
    
Sepsis 4 Hospitals 4/1/15-9/30/18 (1 hospitals) 
7/1/15-9/30/2015 (3 hospitals) 
13 Hospitals 
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Table 4. List of Variables: Type, Definition, and Coding Value 
 Type Definition Coding Value 
Dependent Variable  
    
Discharge Location    
     Home Binary Discharged to home 1=yes; 0=no 
    
Mortality Binary Died in hospital after procedure 1=yes; 0=no 
    
Complication    
     PSI03 Binary Pressure Ulcer 1=yes; 0=no 
     PSI08 Binary In hospital fall with hip fracture 1=yes; 0=no 
     PSItotal Binary Pressure ulcer or in hospital fall 
with hip fracture 
 
    
LOS Continuous Length of hospital stay Day 
    
Total Charge Continuous Total charge $ 
    
Average Charge Continuous Charge per Day $ 
Independent Variable 
    
BPCI Binary BPCI initiative 1= Post-BPCI 
0= Pre-BPCI 
Notes. PSI = patient safety indicator; PSI 03= pressure ulcer; PSI 08=in hospital fall with hip 
fracture; PSI 13=postoperative sepsis; PSI Total = PSI 03 + PSI 08; LOS= length of in-hospital 
stays 




Table 5. Elements of Difference-in-Differences Checklist 
Confirm that How to Test Check 
1. Data exist on study outcomes for 
at least one observation period 
among groups exposed and not 
exposed to an intervention, both 
before and after the intervention 
was implemented 
Directly observable Yes 
   
2. Trends in outcome performance 
prior to an intervention are 
“parallel” between treatment and 
comparison groups 
Test equivalence of linear trends 
between treatment and comparison 
groups prior to intervention by testing 
the significance of the interaction 




   
3. Baseline outcome levels are 
unrelated to expectations for 
changes in outcomes 
For both treatment and comparison 
groups, test whether baseline outcome 
is correlated with change in 
performance across the study period 
Not applicable 
   
4. Violations of standard statistical 
assumptions are appropriately 
addressed 
Test for violations of 
homoscedasticity of standard errors 
Not applicable 
   
5. Events of factors other than 
treatment, occurring at the time of 
treatment, do not differentially 
affect outcomes for treatment and 
comparison groups 
Not directly testable Not applicable 
   
6. The composition of treatment and 
comparison groups does not 
change over the course of the 
study 
Test for difference in observed 
covariates between treatment and 
comparison rates before and after the 
intervention. Test for differential 
drop-out rates between treatment and 
comparison groups 
Yes 
   
7. Treatment does not “spill-over” 
from treatment group to 
comparison group 
Test whether comparison group 
experiences deviation from existing 
trend concurrent with intervention 
Not applicable 
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Table 8. MJRL: Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables 
 Pre Post 
Dependent Variable Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison 
N 2,831 1,818 1,639 2,582 
     
Discharge location     
     Home 0.055 [0.228] 0.184 [0.388] 0.050 [0.218] 0.409 [0.492] 
     
Mortality 0.004 [0.065] 0.006 [0.074] 0.002 [0.043] 0.002 [0.039] 
     
Complication     
     PSI 03 0.005 [0.068] 0.005 [0.070] 0.000 [0.000] 0.001 [0.028] 
     PSI 08 0.002 [0.042] 0.008 [0.090] 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 [0.000] 
     PSI 13 0.002 [0.050] 0.007 [0.081] 0.003 [0.055] 0.004 [0.065] 
     PSI total 0.009 [0.101] 0.020 [0.143] 0.003 [0.055] 0.005 [0.076] 
     
LOS 3.61 [2.47] 3.87 [2.62] 3.39 [2.46] 2.96 [2.50] 
 (1, 42) (1, 36) (1, 58) (1, 46) 
     
Total Charge 112649 [44273] 90999 [40663] 137906 [46689] 95617 [44376] 
 (48245, 791162) (24830, 596396) (53287, 587694) (45557, 631599) 
     
Average Charge 35381 [14111] 27692 [14823] 48530 [21647] 44493 [27749] 
 (2732, 178729) (2854, 148029) (5835, 243773) (7405, 209078) 
Notes. Means are reported with standard deviation in brackets. Minimum and max are reported in 
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; LOS=length of stay; PSI=patient 
safety indicators; PSI 03=pressure ulcer; PSI 08=in hospital fall with hip fracture; PSI 13=postoperative 
sepsis; PSI total indicates incidence of PSI 03, PSI 08, or PSI 13; Total charge is weighted using the 
inpatient hospital inflation rate. 
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017 
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Table 9. Sepsis: Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables 
 Pre Post 
Dependent Variable Treatment Comparison Treatment Comparison 
N 1,332 4,739 2,755 8,530 
     
Discharge location     
     Home 0.169 [0.375] 0.240 [0.427] 0.233 [0.423] 0.271 [0.445] 
     
Mortality 0.248 [0.432] 0.168 [0.374] 0.160 [0.366] 0.135 [0.342] 
     
Complication     
     PSI 03 0.173 [0.378] 0.135 [0.341] 0.028 [0.166] 0.026 [0.159] 
     
LOS 7.91 [6.89] 7.39 [6.12] 7.01 [6.43] 6.72 [5.60] 
 (1, 54) (1, 56) (1, 57) (1, 60) 
     
Total Charge 142782 [139256] 116990 [120721] 140965 [134555] 119818 [115109] 
 (15669, 1151320) (77, 1545745) (2163, 1236934) (3089, 1818046) 
     
Average Charge 20548 [12132] 17210 [12109] 23271 [13347] 19918 [13334] 
 (2986, 108137) (19, 126669) (1176, 166657) (1215, 160164) 
Notes. Means are reported with standard deviation in brackets. Minimum and max are reported in 
parenthesis. LOS=length of stay; PSI=patient safety indicators; PSI 03=pressure ulcer; Total charge is 
weighted using the inpatient hospital inflation rate. 
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017 
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Table 10. Significance of Pre-Trend Test  
 P [Days x Treat 0|Post = 0] 
Dependent Variable MJRL Sepsis 
     
Home 0.000 0.059 0.238 0.442 
Mortality 0.974 0.631 0.133 0.288 
LOS 0.857 0.362 0.489 0.025 
PSI 03 0.047 0.750 0.584 0.301 
PSI 08 0.535 0.903 0.886 0.489 
PSI 13 0.221 0.176 - - 
PSI total 0.436 0.576 0.576 0.261 
Total Charge 0.135 0.585 0.993 0.159 
Average Charge 0.655 0.205 0.160 0.238 
     
Sample Size 4,649 3,159 6,071 4,879 
Hospital FE y y y y 
Time FE y y y y 
Patient Demographics y y y y 
Hospital 
Characteristics 
y y y y 
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15 y y n n 
Drop 4/1/15- 7/1/15 n n y y 
Period:      
    -36 to 27 months y n n n 
    -33 to 30 months n n y n 
    -24 to 24 months n y n y 
Notes. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; LOS=length of stay; PSI=patient safety 
indicators; PSI 03=pressure ulcer; PSI 08=in hospital fall with hip fracture; PSI 13=postoperative sepsis; 
PSI total indicates incidence of PSI03, PSI 08, or PSI 13; Total charge is weighted using the inpatient 
hospital inflation rate. 
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017 
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Table 11. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Home Discharge 
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; COPD=chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease. 
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017 
 
  MJRL Sepsis 
Sample Size   7,093 17,356 
Dependent Variable    
(a) Home Treat  Post -0.080*** 0.042** 
  (0.016) (0.015) 
    
 P [Days x Treat 0|Post = 0] 0.059 0.238 
    
Hospital FE  y y 
Time FE  y y 
Patient Demographics  y y 
Age    
     < 64  -0.013 (0.014) 0.060*** (0.010) 
     75-84  -0.053*** (0.008) -0.084*** (0.008) 
     85 +  -0.130*** (0.011) -0.161*** (0.009) 
Sex    
     Male  0.040*** (0.008) -0.011* (0.006) 
Race    
     Black  -0.002 (0.016) 0.019* (0.011) 
     Hispanic  -0.036** (0.014) 0.074*** (0.013) 
     Asian  0.008 (0.021) 0.037** (0.014) 
     Others  -0.014 (0.019) -0.008 (0.014) 
Comorbidities    
     Diabetes  -0.016 (0.010) -0.009 (0.008) 
     Diabetes w/ complications  -0.089*** (0.014) -0.026** (0.009) 
     Hypertension  -0.007 (0.008) 0.047*** (0.007) 
     Congestive Heart Failures  -0.046** (0.023) -0.065*** (0.009) 
     COPD  -0.062*** (0.012) -0.026*** (0.008) 
     Depression  -0.031** (0.011) -0.036*** (0.011) 
     Obesity  -0.012 (0.016) -0.022* (0.013) 
    
Hospital Characteristics  y y 
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15  y n 
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15  n y 
Period: -24 to 24 months  y n 
Period: -33 to 30 months  n y 
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Table 12. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for In-Hospital Mortality 
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; COPD=chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease. 
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017 
 
 




Mortality Treat  Post 0.001 -0.053*** 
  (0.003) (0.016) 
    
 P [Days x Treat 0|Post = 0] 0.631 0.133 
    
Hospital FE  y y 
Time FE  y y 
Patient Demographics  y y 
Age    
     < 64  -0.001 (0.001) -0.051*** (0.007) 
     75-84  0.003* (0.002) 0.018** (0.007) 
     85 +  0.017*** (0.005) 0.061*** (0.009) 
Sex    
     Male  0.000 (0.001) 0.023*** (0.006) 
Race    
     Black  -0.003*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.009) 
     Hispanic  -0.002 (0.003) -0.020** (0.010) 
     Asian  -0.001 (0.005) 0.003 (0.013) 
     Others  -0.005*** (0.001) 0.011 (0.011) 
Comorbidities    
     Diabetes  0.001 (0.002) -0.013* (0.007) 
     Diabetes w/ complications  0.008 (0.007) -0.015** (0.008) 
     Hypertension  -0.002 (0.002) -0.048*** (0.006) 
     Congestive Heart Failures  -0.001 (0.007) 0.029*** (0.008) 
     COPD  -0.002 (0.003) 0.006 (0.007) 
     Depression  0.001 (0.003) -0.034*** (0.008) 
     Obesity  0.000 (0.001) -0.020** (0.010) 
    
Hospital Characteristics  y y 
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15  y n 
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15  n y 
Period: -24 to 24 months  y n 
Period: -33 to 30 months  n y 
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Table 13. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Complication 
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; PSI total=PSI 03 + PSI 08+PSI13; 
PSI 03 is pressure ulcer; PSI 08 is in hospital fall with hip fracture; PSI 13 is postoperative sepsis; COPD 
= chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017 
 
  MJRL Sepsis 
Sample Size   7,093 17,356 
Dependent Variable    
PSI 03  Treat  Post - -0.036** 
   (0.012) 
  -  
 P [Days x Treat 0|Post = 0]  0.584 
PSI total Treat  Post 0.002 - 
  (0.006)  
    
 P [Days x Treat 0|Post = 0] 0.576 - 
    
Hospital FE  y y 
Time FE  y y 
Patient Demographics  y y 
Age    
     < 64  0.002 (0.004) -0.005 (0.005) 
     75-84  0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.005) 
     85 +  0.019* (0.007) 0.013** (0.006) 
Sex    
     Male  0.006 (0.002) 0.013*** (0.004) 
Race    
     Black  -0.011*** (0.001) 0.003 (0.007) 
     Hispanic  -0.002 (0.006) -0.004 (0.007) 
     Asian  -0.01*** (0.002) -0.023** (0.007) 
     Others  0.014 (0.012) 0.004 (0.008) 
Comorbidities    
     Diabetes  0.002 (0.004) 0.003 (0.005) 
     Diabetes w/ 
Complications 
 0.006 (0.009) 0.007 (0.005) 
     Hypertension  -0.004 (0.003) -0.02*** (0.004) 
     Congestive Heart Failures  0.009 (0.014) -0.007 (0.005) 
     COPD  0.012** (0.006) -0.009* (0.005) 
     Depression  -0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.006) 
     Obesity  0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) 
    
Hospital Characteristics  y y 
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15  y n 
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15  n y 
Period: -24 to 24 months  y n 
Period: -33 to 30 months  n y 
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Table 14. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Length of In-Hospital Stay  
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; LOS=length of in-hospital stays; 
COPD = chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017 
 
  MJRL Sepsis 
Sample Size   7,093 17,356 
Dependent Variable    
LOS Treat  Post -0.069 -0.500** 
  (0.127) (0.254) 
    
 P [Days x Treat 0|Post = 0] 0.362 0.489 
    
Hospital FE  y y 
Time FE  y y 
Patient Demographics  y y 
Age    
     < 64  0.013 (0.093) -0.104 (0.135) 
     75–84  0.400*** (0.069) -0.178 (0.113) 
     85 +  1.217*** (0.122) -0.708*** (0.124) 
Sex    
     Male  -0.089 (0.063) 0.131 (0.089) 
Race    
     Black  0.065 (0.151) 0.238 (0.165) 
     Hispanic  -0.091 (0.133) -0.264 (0.184) 
     Asian  0.035 (0.174) -0.029 (0.197) 
     Others  0.017 (0.172) 0.147 (0.190) 
Comorbidities    
     Diabetes  0.166* (0.082) -0.346*** (0.105) 
     Diabetes w/ complications  0.745*** (0.225) 0.369** (0.136) 
     Hypertension  -0.051 (0.060) -0.762*** (0.091) 
     Congestive Heart Failures  2.192*** (0.392) 1.38*** (0.136) 
     COPD  0.454*** (0.113) 0.522*** (0.115) 
     Depression  0.1094 (0.122) 0.122 (0.139) 
     Obesity  0.082 (0.114) 0.684*** (0.183) 
    
Hospital Characteristics  y y 
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15  y n 
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15  n y 
Period: -24 to 24 months  y n 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18. Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Findings 
Research Question One. 
Does the BPCI initiative show positive effects on the effectiveness of hospital performance 
for MJRL and sepsis? 
Hypothesis 1.  BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the 
effectiveness of hospital performance than non-participating hospitals. 
H1a. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the 
effectiveness of surgical care than non-participating hospitals. 
No 
H1a1a. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to be discharged to home than 
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
No 
findings 
H1a1b. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to be discharged to HHS than 
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
+ 
H1a1c. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative-participating 
hospitals are less likely to be discharged to SNF than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
- 
H1a2. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are less likely to die in hospital than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
NS 
H1a3. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are less likely to have complications than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
NS 
H1b. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the 
effectiveness of medical care than non-participating hospitals. 
Yes 
H1b1a. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to be discharged to home than 
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
+ 
H1b1b. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to be discharged to HHS than 
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
NS 
H1b1c. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are less likely to be discharged to SNF than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
- 
H1b2. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are less likely to die in hospital than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
+ 
H1b3. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are less likely to have complications than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
+ 
Research Question Two. 
Does the BPCI initiative show positive effects on the efficiency of hospital performance 
for MJRL and sepsis? 
Hypothesis 2. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve 
the efficiency of hospital performance than non-participating hospitals. 
 
 117 
H2a. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the 
efficiency of surgical care than non-participating hospitals. 
No 
H2a4. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to have shorter LOS than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
NS 
H2a5. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to have lower total charges than 
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals 
 
NS 
H2a6. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to have lower average charges 
than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
NS 
H2b. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the 
efficiency of medical care than non-participating hospitals. 
Yes 
H2b4. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to have shorter LOS than their 
counterparts in non-participating hospitals. 
 
+ 
H2b5. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to have lower total charges than 
their counterparts in non-participating hospital 
 
+ 
H2b6. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating 
hospitals are more likely to have lower average charges 
than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals 
 
NS 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 14. Gainsharing Distributions Received by Partner Type, Model 2, Q4 2013-Q2 2017 
 
Note: PGP=physician group practice. PAC=post-acute care. HHA=home health agency 














Appendix A. Bundled Payments for Care Improvement List of Clinical Episodes for All Models 
Episode Name 
Anchor     
MS-DRG MS-DRG Title 
Major joint upper 














Amputation for circulation system disorders 
except upper limb and toe with major complications or comorbidities 
240 
Amputation for circulation system disorders except upper limb and toe 
with complications or comorbidities 
241 
Amputation for circulation system disorders except upper limb and toe 
without complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
255 
Upper limb and toe amputation for circulation system disorders with 
major complications or comorbidities 
256 
Upper limb and toe amputation for circulation system disorders with 
complications or comorbidities 
257 
Upper limb and toe amputation for circulation system disorders without 
complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
474 
Amputation for musculoskeletal system and connective tissue disease 
with major complications or comorbidities 
475 
Amputation for musculoskeletal system and connective tissue disease 
with complications or comorbidities 
476 
Amputation for musculoskeletal system and connective tissue disease 
without complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
616 
Amputation of lower limb for endocrine, nutrition, and metabolic 
disease with 
major complications or comorbidities 
617 
Amputation of lower limb for endocrine, nutrition, and metabolic 
disease with 
complications or comorbidities 
618 
Amputation of lower limb for endocrine, nutrition, and metabolic 
disease without complications or comorbidities and major 





Kidney and urinary tract infections with major complications or 
comorbidities 
690 









Acute ischemic stroke with use of thrombolytic agent with major 
complications or comorbidities 
62 
Acute ischemic stroke with use of thrombolytic agent with 
complications or comorbidities 
63 
Acute ischemic stroke with use of thrombolytic agent without 
complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
64 
Intracranial hemorrhage or cerebral infarction with major 
complications or comorbidities 
65 
Intracranial hemorrhage or cerebral infarction with complications or 
comorbidities or tPA in 24 hours 
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66 
Intracranial hemorrhage or cerebral infarction without complications or 











Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with major complications or 
comorbidities 
191 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with complications or 
comorbidities 
192 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease without complications or 
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities 
202 
Bronchitis and asthma with complications or comorbidities and major 
complications or comorbidities 
203 
Bronchitis and asthma without complications or comorbidities and 










Coronary bypass with Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary 
Angioplasty (balloon) with major complications or comorbidities 
232 
Coronary bypass with Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary 
Angioplasty (balloon) without major complications or comorbidities 
233 
Coronary bypass with cardiac catheter with major complications or 
comorbidities 
234 
Coronary bypass with cardiac catheter without major complications or 
comorbidities 
235 
Coronary bypass without cardiac catheter with major complications or 
comorbidities 
236 








Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity with 
major complications or comorbidities 
470 
Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity without 










Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure with drug-eluting stent with 
major complications or comorbidities 
247 
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure 
with drug-eluting stent without major complications or comorbidities 
248 
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure with 
non-drug-eluting stent with major complications or comorbidities 
249 
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure with 
non-drug-eluting stent without major complications or comorbidities 
250 
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure without coronary 
artery stent or Acute myocardial infarction with major complications or 
comorbidities 
251 
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure without coronary artery stent or 






Permanent cardiac pacemaker implant with major complications or 
comorbidities 
243 
Permanent cardiac pacemaker implant with complications or 
comorbidities 
244 
Permanent cardiac pacemaker implant without complications or 
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities 








myocardial infarction/heart failure/shock with major complications or 
comorbidities 
223 
Cardiac defibrillator implant with cardiac catheter with Acute 
myocardial infarction/heart failure/shock without major complications 
or comorbidities 
224 
Cardiac defibrillator implant with cardiac catheter without Acute 
myocardial infarction/heart failure/shock with major complications or 
comorbidities 
225 
Cardiac defibrillator implant with cardiac catheter without Acute 
myocardial infarction/heart failure/shock without major complications 
or comorbidities 
226 
Cardiac defibrillator implant without cardiac catheter with major 
complications or comorbidities 
227 
Cardiac defibrillator implant without cardiac catheter without major 










Cardiac pacemaker device replacement with major complications or 
comorbidities 
259 
Cardiac pacemaker device replacement without major complications or 
comorbidities 
260 
Cardiac pacemaker revision except device replacement with major 
complications or comorbidities 
261 
Cardiac pacemaker revision except device replacement with cardiac 
catheterization 
262 
Cardiac pacemaker revision except device replacement without 






generator or lead 
245 
Automatic implantable cardiac defibrillator lead and generator 
procedures 





291 Heart failure and shock with major complications or comorbidities 
292 Heart failure and shock with cardiac catheterization 
293 
Heart failure and shock without complications or comorbidities and 







Acute myocardial infarction, disease/discharged alive with major 
complications or comorbidities 
281 
Acute myocardial infarction, disease/discharged alive with 
complications or comorbidities 
282 
Acute myocardial infarction, disease/discharged alive without 







Cardiac arrhythmia and conduction disorders with major complications 
or comorbidities 
309 
Cardiac arrhythmia and conduction disorders with complications or 
comorbidities 
310 
Cardiac arrhythmia and conduction disorders without complications or 
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities 
 
Cardiac valve  216 
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure with card 










Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure with cardio 
catheter with complications or comorbidities 
218 
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure with card 
catheter without complications or comorbidities and major 
complications or comorbidities 
219 
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure without card 
catheter with major complications or comorbidities 
220 
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure without card 
catheter with complications or comorbidities 
221 
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure without card 
catheter without complications or comorbidities and major 
complications or comorbidities 
266 
Endovascular Cardiac Valve Replacement with major complications or 
comorbidities 
267 






252 Other vascular procedures with major complications or comorbidities 
253 Other vascular procedures with complications or comorbidities 
254 
Other vascular procedures without complications or comorbidities and 






Major cardiovascular procedures with major complications or 
comorbidities 
238 






377 Gastrointestinal hemorrhage with major complications or comorbidities 
378 Gastrointestinal hemorrhage with complications or comorbidities 
379 
Gastrointestinal hemorrhage without complications or comorbidities 





Major small and large bowel procedures with major complications or 
comorbidities 
330 
Major small and large bowel procedures with major complications or 
comorbidities 
331 
Major small and large bowel procedures without complications or 






533 Fractures of femur with major complications or comorbidities 
534 Fractures of femur without major complications or comorbidities 
535 Fractures of hip and pelvis with major complications or comorbidities 
536 














Sprains, strains, and disease locations of hip, pelvis and thigh with 
complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
538 
Sprains, strains, and disease locations of hip, pelvis and thigh without 
complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
551 Medical back problems with major complications or comorbidities 
552 Medical back problems without major complications or comorbidities 
553 
Bone diseases and arthropathies with major complications or 
comorbidities 










Signs and symptoms of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 
with major complications or comorbidities 
556 
Signs and symptoms of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 
without major complications or comorbidities 
557 
Tendonitis, myositis and bursitis with major complications or 
comorbidities 
558 
Tendonitis, myositis and bursitis without major complications or 
comorbidities 
559 
Aftercare, musculoskeletal system and connective tissue with major 
complications or comorbidities 
560 
Aftercare, musculoskeletal system and connective tissue with cardiac 
catheterization 
561 
Aftercare, musculoskeletal system and connective tissue without 
complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
562 
Fixed area, sprains, strains and disease except femur, hip, pelvis and 
thigh with major complications or comorbidities 
563 
Fixed area, sprains, strains and disease except femur, hip, pelvis and 







Bilateral or multiple major joint procedures of lower extremity with 
major complications or comorbidities 
462 
Bilateral or multiple major joint procedures of lower extremity without 
major complications or comorbidities 
Revision of the 




Revision of hip or knee replacement with major complications or 
comorbidities 
467 
Revision of hip or knee replacement with complications or 
comorbidities 
468 
Revision of hip or knee replacement without complications or 





Spinal fusion except Cervical with major complications or 
comorbidities 
460 
Spinal fusion except Cervical without major complications or 
comorbidities 







Hip and femur procedures except major joint with major complications 
or comorbidities 
481 
Hip and femur procedures except major joint with complications or 
comorbidities 
482 
Hip and femur procedures except major joint without complications or 





471 Cervical spinal fusion with major complications or comorbidities 
472 Cervical spinal fusion with complications or comorbidities 
473 
Cervical spinal fusion without complications or comorbidities and 







Knee procedures with primary diagnosis of infection with major 
complications or comorbidities 
486 
Knee procedures with primary diagnosis of infection with 
complications or comorbidities 
487 Knee procedures with primary diagnosis of infection without 
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  complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
488 
Knee procedures without primary diagnosis of infection with 
complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
489 
Knee procedures without primary diagnosis of infection without 








Spinal fusion except cervical with spinal curve, malignant or 9+ fusions 
with major complications or comorbidities 
457 
Spinal fusion except cervical with spinal curve, malignant or 9+ fusions 
with complications or comorbidities 
458 
Spinal fusion except cervical with spinal curve, malignant or 9+ fusions 








Combined anterior/posterior spinal fusion with major complications or 
comorbidities 
454 
Combined anterior/posterior spinal fusion with complications or 
comorbidities 
455 
Combined anterior/posterior spinal fusion without complications or 
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities 






Back and neck procedures except spinal fusion with major 
complications or comorbidities or disc device/neurostimulator 
519 
Back and neck procedures except spinal fusion with complications or 
comorbidities 
520 
Back and neck procedures except spinal fusion without complication or 








Lower extreme and humerus procedure except hip, foot, femur with 
major complications or comorbidities 
493 
Lower extreme and humerus procedure except hip, foot, femur with 
complications or comorbidities 
494 
Lower extreme and humerus procedure except hip, foot, femur without 










Local excision and removal internal fix devices except hip and femur 
with major complications or comorbidities 
496 
Local excision and removal internal fix devices except hip and femur 
with complications or comorbidities 
497 
Local excision and removal internal fix devices except hip and femur 
without complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
498 
Local excision and removal internal fix devices of hip and femur with 
complications or comorbidities and major complications or 
comorbidities 
499 
Local excision and removal internal fix devices of hip and femur 
without 




870 Septicemia with MV 96+ hours 
871 Septicemia without MV 96+ hours with major complications or 
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  comorbidities 
872 





637 Diabetes with major complications or comorbidities 
638 Diabetes with complications or comorbidities 
639 
Diabetes without complications or comorbidities and major 











Respiratory infections and inflammations with major complications or 
comorbidities 
178 
Respiratory infections and inflammations with complications or 
comorbidities 
179 
Respiratory infections and inflammations without complications or 
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities 
193 
Simple pneumonia and pleurisy with major complications or 
comorbidities 
194 Simple pneumonia and pleurisy with complications or comorbidities 
195 
Simple pneumonia and pleurisy without complications or comorbidities 
and major complications or comorbidities 









189 Pulmonary edema and respiratory failure 
204 Respiratory signs and symptoms 
205 
Other respiratory system diagnoses with major complications or 
comorbidities 
206 
Other respiratory system diagnoses without major complications or 
comorbidities 
207 Respiratory system diagnosis with ventilator support 96+ hours 
208 Respiratory system diagnosis with ventilator support <96 hours 
186 Pleural effusion with major complications or comorbidities 
187 Pleural effusion with complications or comorbidities 
188 
Pleural effusion without complications or comorbidities and major 
complications or comorbidities 








Peripheral vascular disorders with major complications or 
comorbidities 
300 Peripheral vascular disorders with complications or comorbidities 
301 
Peripheral vascular disorders without complications or comorbidities 
and major complications or comorbidities 
Atherosclerosis 
  
302 Atherosclerosis with major complications or comorbidities 





388 Gastrointestinal obstruction with major complications or comorbidities 
389 Gastrointestinal obstruction with complications or comorbidities 
390 
Gastrointestinal obstruction without complications or comorbidities and 
major complications or comorbidities 
Syncope and 




682 Renal failure with major complications or comorbidities 
683 Renal failure with complications or comorbidities 
684 
Renal failure without complications or comorbidities and major 
complications or comorbidities 
 140 
Syncope and 




682 Renal failure with major complications or comorbidities 
683 Renal failure with complications or comorbidities 
684 
Renal failure without complications or comorbidities and major 






Nutritional and miscellaneous metabolic 
disorders with major complications or comorbidities 
641 
Nutrition and miscellaneous metabolic 
disorders without major complications or comorbidities 
Cellulitis 
  
602 Cellulitis with major complications or comorbidities 
603 Cellulitis without major complications or comorbidities 
Red blood cell 
disorders 
  
811 Red blood cell disorders with major complications or comorbidities 




69 Transient ischemia 
684 
Renal failure without complications or comorbidities and major 







Esophagitis, gastroenteritis and miscellaneous digest disorders with 
major complications or comorbidities 
392 
Esophagitis, gastroenteritis and miscellaneous digest disorders without 
major complications or comorbidities 




Appendix B. Glossary of Acronyms Related to this study 
Abbreviation Meaning 
ACA Affordable Care Act 
ACE Acute Care Episode 
AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
BPCI Bundled Payments for Care Improvement 
CJR Comprehensive care for joint replacement 
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
COPD Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
DiD Difference-in-Differences 
ED Emergency Department 
EGDT Early Goal-Directed Therapy 
FFS Fee for Service 
HHS Home Health Service 
HRRP Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
ICD-9-CM International Classification of Diseases, Ninth 
Revision, Clinical Modification 
IP Rehab Inpatient Rehabilitation  
LOS Length of hospital stay 
MS-DRG Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related Group 
NIS National Inpatient Sample 
PAC Post-Acute Care 
PCP  Primary Care Physician  
PSI Patient Safety Indicator 
SIDN State Inpatient Databases of Nevada 
SNF Skilled Nursing Facility 
TJA Total Joint Arthroplasty 
THA Total Hip Arthroplasty 
TKA Total Knee Arthroplasty 
MJRL Major Joint Replacement of the Lower Extremity 
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Appendix C. ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes for Comorbidities 
 ICD-9 ICD-10 
Diabetes, uncomplicated 250.0-250.3 E10.0, E10.1, E10.9, E11.0, 
E11.9, E12.0, E12.1, E12.9, 
E13.0, E13.1, E13.9, E14.0, 
E14.1, E14.9 
Diabetes, complications 250.4-250.7, 250.9 E10.2-E10.8, E11.2-E11.8, 
E12.2-E12.8, E13.2-E13.8, 
E14.2-E14.8 
Hypertension 243-244.2, 244.8, 244.9 240.9, 243.x, 244.x, 246.1, 
246.8 
Congestive heart failure 398.91, 402,11, 402.91, 
414.11, 414.13, 414.91, 
414.93, 428.x 
I90.9, I11.0, I13.0, I13.2, 
I125.5, I42.0, I42.5-I42.9, 





416.8, 416.9, 490.x-505.x, 
506.4, 508.1, 508.8 
Obesity 278.0 E66.x 
Depression 300.4, 301.12, 309.0, 309.1, 
311 
F20.4, F31,3-F31,5, F32.x, 
F33.x, F34.1, F41.2, F43.2 
Source: Quan et al (2005). Coding algorithms for defining comorbidities in ICD-9-CM and ICD-
10 administrative data.  
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Appendix D. ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes for Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) 




7070, 70700, 70701, 70702, 
70703, 70704, 70705, 70706, 
70707, 70709, 70723, 70725, 
70725 
L8990, L89009, L89119, 
L89129, L89139, L89149, 
L89159, L89209, L89309, 







(In Hospital Fall with 
Hip Fracture) 
82000, 82001, 82002, 
82003,82009, 82010, 82011, 
82012, 82013, 82019, 82020, 
82021, 82022, 82030, 82031, 
82032, 8208, 8209 
S72019A, S72023A, S72026A, 
S72033A, S72036A, S72043A, 
S72046A, S72099A, S72019B, 
S72019C, S72023B, S72023C, 
S72026B, S72026C, S72033B, 
S72033C, S72036B, S72036C, 
S72043B, S72043C, S72046B, 
S72046C, S72099B, S72099C, 
S72109B, S72143A, S72146A, 
S7223XA, S7226XA, 
S72109B, S72109C, S72143B, 






0380, 0381, 03810, 03811, 
03812, 03819, 0382, 0383, 
03840, 03841, 03842, 03843, 
03844, 03849, 0388, 0389, 
78552, 99591, 99592, 9980, 
99802 
A409, A411 A412, A4101, 
A4102, A403, A414, A4150, 
A413, A4151, A4152, A4153, 
A4159, A4189, A419 
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